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Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) is a systematic and comprehensive 
methodology to evaluate risks associated with a complex engineered technological entity. The 
information provided by PSA has been increasingly implemented for regulatory purposes but 
rarely used in providing information for operation and maintenance activities. As one of the 
key parts in PSA, Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) attempts to model and analyze failure processes 
of engineering and biological systems. The fault trees are composed of logic diagrams that 
display the state of the system and are constructed using graphical design techniques.  
Risk Importance Measures (RIMs) are information that can be obtained from both 
qualitative and quantitative aspects of FTA. Components within a system can be ranked with 
respect to each specific criterion defined by each RIM. Through a RIM, a ranking of the 
components or basic events can be obtained and provide valuable information for risk-
informed decision making. Various RIMs have been applied in various applications. In order 
to provide a thorough understanding of RIMs and interpret the results, they are categorized 
with respect to risk significance (RS) and safety significance (SS) in this thesis. This has also 
tied them into different maintenance activities. When RIMs are used for maintenance 
purposes, it is called risk-informed maintenance. 
On the other hand, the majority of work produced on the FTA method has been 
concentrated on failure logic diagrams restricted to the direct or implied use of AND and 
OR operators. Such systems are considered as coherent systems. However, the NOT logic 
can also contribute to the information produced by PSA. The importance analysis of non-
coherent systems is rather limited, even though the field has received more and more 
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attention over the years. The non-coherent systems introduce difficulties in both qualitative 
and quantitative assessment of the fault tree compared with the coherent systems.  
In this thesis, a set of RIMs is analyzed and investigated. The 8 commonly used RIMs 
(Birnbaum‘s Measure, Criticality Importance Factor, Fussell-Vesely Measure, Improvement 
Potential, Conditional Probability, Risk Achievement, Risk Achievement Worth, and Risk 
Reduction Worth) are extended to non-coherent forms. Both coherent and non-coherent 
forms are classified into different categories in order to assist different types of maintenance 
activities.  The real systems such as the Steam Generator Level Control System in CANDU 
Nuclear Power Plant (NPP), a Gas Detection System, and the Automatic Power Control 
System of the experimental nuclear reactor are presented to demonstrate the application of 
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The assurance of quality for safety related structure, system and components (SSCs) 
has always been an initial part of design and regulation of Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs). 
Traditionally, the safety and regulation of NPPs has been based upon deterministic 
approaches that consider how a set of challenges should be handled. The deterministic 
approach has been successfully implemented over the years as no major failure and damage 
has occurred [1]. However, there are downsides of the approach. The arbitrary nature of the 
safety criteria, the potential inconsistencies in the judgments on relative probabilities, and the 
lack of definition for ‗safety‘ became increasingly evident during the 1960s. Thus, 
probabilistic approaches to plant safety were proposed [2][3][4].  
A probabilistic approach to regulation enhances and extends the traditional 
deterministic approach by introducing the concept of risk and safety significance that allows 
the designer and operator to focus on important issues. Emphasis was initially placed on 
relative risks but now regulatory decision making is employing both relative and absolute risk 
by defining the measures of risks. The probabilistic approach is called Probabilistic Safety 
Assessment (PSA). It is now a fundamental tool that provides guidance to safety related 
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decision making and is being used to complement the deterministic approach to achieve 
nuclear safety. 
As one of the broad PSA applications is numerical rankings of the risk and safety 
significance of structure, system and components (SSCs), i.e. the quantification of the 
contribution of SSCs to plant safety and reliability, PSA can not only be used for regulatory 
purposes, it is also a suitable method to handle operational issues such as surveillance testing 
and maintenance activities [5]. Thus risk-informed maintenance provides PSA insights to 
help focus monitoring of SSC performance and to ensure that the system performs 
effectively during maintenance activities. 
The PSA methodology in the application of maintenance rules has four steps [1]: 
1. After calculating their risk importance measures (RIMs), rank components 
according to their significance. Assign components to high and low risk/safety 
significance categories; 
2. Assess the adequacy and completeness of the supporting PSA and other risk 
models by a series of sensitivity analysis. 
3. Evaluation of the cumulative impact on plant risk of extending the in-service test 
intervals for many low significant components. 
4. Review the process and results with the expert panel. This review should blend 
deterministic safety insights with quantitative risk measures to ensure that 




The transition of the United States nuclear industry from a prescriptive regulatory to 
a more risk-informed approach to operations and regulations occurred over a 20 year period 
in which gradual changes were made in the fundamental regulations and to the approach to 
nuclear safety and operations. The experience of risk-informed approach in regulatory 
decision making has shown positive results in both safety and economics in United States. 
The use of risk information in operations and regulation is marginally better with no 
degradation in safety when plants that have embraced risk-informed approaches are 
compared to those that have not. The use of risk-informed approaches allows both the 
regulator and the industry to focus on important safety issues. The transition to risk-
informed regulation also required a ‗‗culture change‘‘ by both the regulators and the utilities. 
Caution should be taken, however, since the basis of the US transition to risk-informed 
regulation is founded on a long history of a regulatory structure and practices that have 
matured the industry to a point where the next step could be taken [6]. The use of risk 
insights in maintenance activities was mentioned at the early 1990s, when the maintenance 
rule enabled utilities to take advantages of their Individual Plant Examinations (IPEs) in 
developing a risk-informed maintenance program [7].  
On the other hand, the use of PSA for regulatory decision making has been growing 
at 1980s since the Three Mile Island Accident (TMI-2) occurred in 1979. The investigation 
on the event has revealed the critical human factor problems about the industrial design of 
the reactor control system's user interface. The ambiguous nature of indicators did not show 
the maintenance or repair priority among the components that have all been indicated as 
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failed at the same time. Therefore, the maintenance activity involving PSA insights is an area 
that warrants further investigation. 
1.3 Objective of the Thesis 
In a risk-informed maintenance framework, Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) is one of the 
techniques adopted to gain insight into the dependence of each sub-system in the safety 
systems. The risk importance measures (RIMs) from PSA analysis are utilized to provide 
sufficient information about potential weak spot in the system so that appropriate 
maintenance decisions can be made.  Fault trees are used to model the different safety 
systems that mitigate or cause initiating events in PSA. The aim of the fault tree is to 
determine the occurrence of the top event in terms of occurrence or non-occurrence of the 
events. While most of the systems have coherent structures, some systems have non-
coherent structure due to the nature of the system or bad real world design. Thus, the 
investigation on various RIMs as well as the extension of RIMs to the non-coherent systems 
is necessary. On the other hand, different RIMs have different use in maintenance activities 
and they should be classified into different categorizes for different purposes. 
1.4 Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents the background survey 
including the further introduction of PSA, FTA and maintenance engineering. Chapter 3 
presents various risk importance measures (RIMs) along with their extension for non-
coherent FTA. The various RIMs are classified into different categories for different 
purposes with further discussion, both in coherent and non-coherent systems in Chapter 4. 
Chapter 5 uses three real-world applications as case studies to back up the methodology. In 
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Chapter 6, the conclusions of the current research will be summarized, as well as discussion 






2.1 Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) 
2.1.1 Introduction 
Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) was widely adopted in safety critical areas such 
as nuclear power generation, aerospace systems, chemical industry, etc. It has become an 
analytical tool used to assess the safety of safety critical facilities under various events, which 
also identifies potential modes of system failures by determining the likelihood and 
consequences of their occurrence. 
 In the nuclear industry, PSA usually attempts to answers three basic questions: 
I. What can go wrong with the studied technological entity, or what are the 
initiators or initiating events (undesirable starting events) that lead to adverse 
consequence(s)?  
II. What and how severe are the potential detriments, or the adverse consequences 
that the technological entity may be eventually subjected to as a result of the 
occurrence of the initiator?  
7 
 
III. How likely are these undesirable consequences to occur, or what are their 
probabilities or frequencies?  
PSA can be classified into three levels progressively: 
Level 1: analysis of the probability of certain critical states being reached (e.g. ―loss of 
coolant‖ in an NPP); 
Level 2: analysis of the consequences of various critical states being reached, with the 
associated probabilities;  
Level 3: further analysis of the probable (adverse) effects on humans, including an estimation 
of the extent of the loss of life and when this might occur. 
 PSA typically involves both qualitative and quantitative analysis by using Fault Tree 
Analysis (FTA). 
2.1.2 Fault Tree Analysis  
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) was developed for projects where errors are intolerable. It 
was first conceived in 1961 by H. A Watson of Bell Telephone Laboratories in connection 
with a US Air Force Contract to study the Minuteman Missile Launch Control System [8]. It 
was recognized by Dave Haasl of Boeing [9] as a significant system safety analysis tool in 
1963 and the first major use was applied by Boeing on the entire Minuteman system for 
safety evaluation was in 1964. Boeing also began using FTA on the design and evaluation of 
commercial aircraft in 1966. Later on, Boeing developed a 12-phase fault tree simulation 
program and a fault tree plotting program on a Calcomp roll plotter.  
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FTA was fully adopted by the aerospace industry including aircraft and weapons 
before the 1970‘s, and was then adopted by the nuclear power industry in 1971. It helped the 
power industry enhance codes and algorithms; some of the more recognized software codes 
include: Prepp/Kitt, SETS, FTAP, and COMCAN. In the 1980‘s, FTA usage started 
becoming international, primarily via the nuclear power industry; the evaluation algorithms 
and codes were developed afterwards. It has continually been used on many systems in many 
countries and is commonly adopted by the robotics and software industry. Since then, FTA 
became an applicable tool that evaluates complex system. It identifies events that can cause 
undesired events and investigates accidents to ensure safety, reliability and unavailability. In 
other words, the FTA not only identifies root cause, but also provides risk assessment.  
A fault tree (Figure 2.1) is a visualized model that intuitively displays cause-
consequence relationships, fault events, normal events and probabilities. It is a structure by 
which a particular system failure mode can be expressed in terms of the combination of 
component failure modes and operator actions. The system failure mode to be considered is 
determined to be the ‗top event‘ and the fault tree is developed in branches below this 
particular event, showing its causes. In this way events presented in the tree are continually 
redefined in terms of more specific events. This development process is terminated when 
component failure events, termed basic events, are encountered.  
An FTA can be carried out by providing information on the basic events and their 
probabilities, which produces the evaluation qualitatively and quantitatively. The qualitative 
analysis identifies the combinations of the basic events which cause the top event, i.e. cut sets; 
the quantitative analysis will result in predictions of the system performance in terms of 
component level performance data, i.e. probability of failure or frequency of failure [10] [11]. 
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The quantitative analysis incorporates probability, cut sets, and risk importance measures to 
complete the evaluation. 
 
Figure 2.1: A Fault Tree Example 
2.1.3 Event Tree Analysis 
Event Tree Analysis (ETA) is complimentary to other techniques such as FTA and 
FMECA (Failure Modes Effect Criticality Analysis) in PSA. Unlike fault tree as a top-down 
structure for the analysis of a system, an event tree is a bottom-up structure and a ―logic 
method for identifying various possible outcome of a given event which is called the 
initiating event‖ [12]. It is applicable to physical systems, with or without human operators 
and also decision-making and management systems.  
An event tree commences with an initiating (or basic) event and works forward in 
time considering all possible subsequent events until the final consequences are determined – 
either the system corrects itself or some level or some level of system failure occurs. An 
event tree can represent the logical order in which the events in a system occur (Figure 2.2).  
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 Fault trees and event trees are used most often in combination to represent a system. 
Advanced methodologies have been developed for both FTA and ETA [13][14]. The 
dynamic properties of the system are also taken into consideration in these studies. However, 
ETA is not the focus in this thesis. 
 
Figure 2.2: An Example of Event Tree Model  
2.1.4 Qualitative Analysis 
2.1.4.1 Overview 
Qualitative analysis is one of the two stages in FTA, which aims to identify the casual 
relationships between the system components. During qualitative analysis all the possible 
causes of system failure are identified. Once a fault tree is constructed for a system, it is then 
necessary to determine the cut sets. A cut set consists of a collection of basic events. If all the 
basic events in the cut set occur, the top event is guaranteed to occur. For coherent fault 
trees each possible cause of system failure is called a minimal cut set, which is a combination 
of component failures that are both necessary and sufficient to cause system failure.  
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In the case of non-coherent fault trees (introduced in Section 2.3) both component 
failed states and working states can contribute to system failure. Hence each possible cause 
of system failure is called a prime implicant set and is a combination of component failure 
states and component working states that are both necessary and sufficient to fail. 
2.1.4.2 Obtaining Minimal Cut Sets 
Minimal cut sets are normally obtained by converting a logic expression for the top 
event into disjunctive normal form. At this point, Boolean algebra laws are used to remove 
the redundancies in the expression leaving it in the required minimal form. Three operator: 
OR, AND and NOT are the three basic operations used in Boolean algebra. In a fault tree, 




Figure 2.3: OR gate, AND gate and Inverter (or NOT gate) 
The OR gate (Figure 2.3a) is a digital logic gate that implements logical disjunction - 
it behaves according to the truth table (Table 2.1). A HIGH output 1 results if one or both 
the inputs to the gate are HIGH (1). If neither input is HIGH, a LOW output 0 results. The 




A B A+B 
0 0 0 
0 1 1 
1 0 1 
1 1 1 
Table 2.1: Truth Table defining OR operation 
The AND gate (Figure 2.3b) is a digital logic gate that implements logical 
conjunction - it behaves according to the truth table (Table 2.2). A HIGH output 1 results 
only if both the inputs to the AND gate are HIGH (1). If neither or only one input to the 
AND gate is HIGH, a LOW output results. The Boolean expression for the AND operation 
is x=A∙B. 
A B A∙B 
0 0 0 
0 1 0 
1 0 0 
1 1 1 
Table 2.2: Truth Table defining AND operation 
An inverter or NOT gate (Figure 2.3c) is a logic gate which implements logical 
negation. If the variable A is subjected to the NOT operation, the result x can be expressed 
as:    . The truth table is shown in Table 2.3. 
A x=  
0 1 
1 0 
Table 2.3: Truth Table Defining NOT logic 
Various Boolean theorems (rules) can help simplifying logic expressions for fault 
tress. The first group of theorems is given in Figure 2.4. In each theorem, x is a logic variable 
that can be either 0 or 1. Each theorem is accompanied by a logic-circuit diagram that 
demonstrates its validity. 
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Theorem (1) states that if any variable is ANDed with 0, the result must be 0. The 
AND operation is similar to ordinary multiplication, where anything multiplied by 0 is 0. The 
output of an AND gate will be 0 whenever any input is 0, regardless of the level on the other 
input. 
Theorem (2) is also obvious by comparison with ordinary multiplication. 
Theorem (3) can be proved by trying each case. If x = 0, then 0 ∙ 0 = 0; if x = 1, then 

























Figure 2.4: Single-variable Theorems 
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Theorem (4) can be proved in the same manner. However, it can also be reasoned 
that any time either x or its inverse  ’ (or  ) must be at the 0 level, and so their AND 
product always must be 0. 
Theorem (5) states that 0 added to anything does not affect its value in OR gate.  
Theorem (6) states that if any variable is ORed with 1, the result will always be 1.  
Theorem (7) can be proved by checking for both values of x: 0 + 0 = 0 and 1 + 1 = 
1. 
Theorem (8) can be proved similarly, or at any time either x or  ’ must be at the 1 
level so that we are always ORing a 0 and a 1, which always results in 1. 
When theorems (1) through (8) are applied, the variable x may actually represent an 
expression containing more than one variable. The theorems represented below involve 
more than one variable: 
(9) x + y = y + x 
(10) x ∙ y = y ∙ x 
(11) x + (y + z) = (x + y) + z = x + y + z 
(12) x(yz) = (xy)z = xyz 
(13a) x(y + z) = xy + xz 
(13b) (w + x)(y + z) = wy + xy + wz + xz 
(14) x + xy = x 
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(15a) x + x‘y = x + y 
(15b) x‘ + xy = x‘ + y 
Theorem (9) and (10) are called the commutative laws. These laws indicate that the 
order in which we OR or AND two variables is unimportant; the result is identical. 
Theorems (11) and (12) are the associative laws, which state that the variables in an 
AND expression or OR expression can be grouped differently. 
Theorem (13) is the distributive law, which states that an expression can be expanded 
by multiplying term by term just the same as in ordinary algebra. This theorem also indicates 
that an expression can be factored. That is, for a sum of two (or more) terms, each of which 
contains a common variable, the common variable can be factored out just as in ordinary 
algebra. For example, if we have the expression          , the    variable can be factored 
as: 
 B C+ B C =B ( C+ C ) 
As another example, consider the expression  BC+ BD . Here the two terms have the 
variables A and B in common, and so  ∙  can be factored out of both terms. That is, 
 BC+ BD= B(C+D) 
  Theorems (9) to (13) are identical to those of ordinary algebra. Theorems (14) and 
(15), on the other hand, do not have any counterparts in ordinary algebra. Each can be 
proved be trying all possible cases for x and y. This is illustrated (for theorem 14) by creating 
an analysis table for the equation x + xy as follows: 
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x y xy x + xy 
0 0 0 0 
0 1 0 0 
1 0 0 1 
1 1 0 1 
Table 2.4: Boolean Algebra 
The value of the entire expression (x + xy) is always the same as x. 
Theorem (14) can also be proved factoring and using theorem (6) and (2) as follows: 
x+xy=x 1+y =x∙1=x 
In FTA, the top down approach is commonly used to obtain the minimal cut sets 
and prime implicant sets by developing a Boolean expression for the top-event completely in 
terms of basic component failures. This approach starts with the top gate and expands each 
gate by substituting in the inputs that lie directly below it. This process is repeated until the 
expression has only basic component failures. The Boolean reduction laws introduced above 
are also applied where possible to simplify the expression. The minimal cut sets of the fault 














Figure 2.5: Fault Tree Diagram 
Starting with the top gate which is an AND gate with two inputs G1 and G2 the 
following expression is obtained: 
Top=G1∙G2 












G2=G4+c+G5=d∙e+c+b∙ a+e =d∙e+c+b∙a+b∙e 
Substitute the expression of G1 and G2 into Top: 
Top=G1∙G2= b∙c+a  d∙e+c+b∙a+b∙e  
Expanding this gives the following expression:  
Top=b∙c∙d∙e+b∙c∙c+a∙b∙b∙c+b∙b∙c∙e+a∙d∙e 
+a∙c+a∙a∙b+a∙b∙e 
Finally simplifying the expression applying the Boolean reduction laws, the logic 
expression is obtained for the top event. 
Top=a∙d∙e+a∙b+a∙c+b∙c 
The four minimal cut sets obtained from this example are: 
{a,d,e}, {a,b}, {a,c}, {b,c} 
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2.1.5 Quantitative Analysis 
As another stage of FTA, quantitative analysis usually follows qualitative analysis. It 
involves quantification of the system availability and reliability parameters and analysis of 
component and/or importance of minimal cut set.  
2.1.5.1 Reliability Parameters 
A technique is developed to approximate the reliability parameters for a system that 
consists of several components in [16] because of the complication of quantitative analysis.  
The calculation is relatively easy and sufficient accuracy can be obtained. The commonly 
used reliability parameters can be calculated as follows: 






                                                                 (2.1) 
where λi and µi are the failure rate and repair rate of the component i, respectively. Because λi 






                                                                   (2.2) 
 The conditional failure intensity for a cut set j at time t can be expressed as: 
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i=1         repairable
                                (2.3) 
where i is the component i in the cut set j in (2.3); n is the total number of components in the 
cut set and the superscript ―*‖ indicates that the parameters are for cut sets. 
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  The parameters for a system can be approximated from the parameters of the cut 
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 s   j
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j=1                                                        (2.7) 
where j indicates the cut set number j; the subscript s means the system; and m is the total 
number of cut sets in the system. 
 The unavailability of a system calculated based on the above equations is generally 
higher than the real system unavailability, which could result in a larger safety margin. 
However, it should be noted that the discrepancy between the calculated result and the real 
one can become significant in the following cases: 
1. For a repairable component i, the unavailability is evaluated at less than twice the 
mean repair time 1/µi;  
2. For a non-repairable component i, the unavailability is evaluated at more than one-
tenth the mean time to failure MTTF   1/ λi ; and  
3. The unavailability of a component is greater than 0.1. 
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2.1.5.2 Calculating the Top Event Probability 
As introduced in [17], the inclusion-exclusion expansion is commonly used to 
calculate the top event probability. It produces the correct result for trees with repeated 
events, provided the assumption that basic events are independent.  
Consider a fault tree with n minimal cut sets 




i=1                              (2.8) 





i=1   =P C1+C2+…+Cn                      (2.9) 











i=2 C1 C2 … Cn)     (2.10) 
To illustrate the calculating process using the method, consider the top event given: 
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sys
=P Top =P a∙b+b∙c+a∙c  








































where qi represents the unavailability of the component i. 












The above is the demonstration of calculating the top event probability for coherent 
fault trees. For non-coherent fault trees, suppose a system with 5 prime implicants include 
non-coherent event(s) and the Boolean expression obtained from these prime implicants is: 
T=a∙b∙d+a∙b ∙c+c ∙d∙e+a∙d∙e+a∙c∙d 













































































2.1.6 Common Cause Failure Analysis 
The Common Cause Failures (CCFs) are taken into consideration when performing 
PSA. A CCF is a condition or an event that causes all the basic events to occur in at least one 
of the minimal cut sets or prime implicant sets. Even though there are enough redundancies 
in safety systems in an NPP, these redundancies may lose their ability to protect the plant if 
there is a CCF. Therefore, the analysis of the CCF is a very important component for PSA.  
2.2 Risk Importance Measures  
One of the goals for PSA study is to identify the importance of structure, system and 
components (SSCs). Thus, risk importance measures (RIMs) are computed in PSA to 
identify the important risk contributors and the important risk sensitivities. Various types of 
RIMs are calculated, including risk contribution importance, risk reduction importance and 
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risk increase importance; and they also go by various names such as Birnbaum‘s Measure, 
Criticality Importance Factor, Fussell-Vesely Importance, etc. 
The RIMs usually depend on two factors: (1) the location of the component in the 
system; and (2) the reliability of the component in the system. Minimal cut sets or prime 
implicant sets provided by PSA are one the qualitative ways to examine these RIMs. As the 
resources, such as man power or cost, are rather limited and have to be directed where they 
are most efficient, some kind of quantitative measures are needed. That would allow 
reliability engineers to identify and rank the most important components. 
RIMs can be used to evaluate the importance quantitatively on the framework 
provided by PSA. There are generally three areas of application assigned to RIMs [18]: 
1. (Re)Design: optimization of the plant design by adding or removing components; 
2. Test and maintenance: optimization of the plant performance by changing the 
test and maintenance strategy for a given design; 
3. Daily configuration control: what will be the effect of taking a component out of 
service. 
2.2.1 Risk Importance Measures for Basic Events 
Component failures are modeled in PSA studies as one or more basic events, so the 
importance of the basic events is used to evaluate the importance of component failures. 
This means that it is correct to assess a failed event or failed states importance, and not 
vaguely speak of the component importance [19]. RIMs depend on the risk reference, which 
means that component importance differs when calculated for different accident sequences.  
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The eight commonly used RIMs and there mathematical definitions are listed in 
Table 2.5. The detailed definitions of various RIMs are described in Chapter 3. 
For groups of basic events some additional considerations have to be taken. 
Components can consist of multiple basic events, which could be the different failed states 
identified for the component. Fussell-Vesely Measure can be readily used for groups of basic 
events; the sum is just modified to include all the minimal cut sets and prime implicant sets 
that have some members of the group. 
Importance Measures Definition 





















Improvement Potential (IP) GIP=GBM∙qi=GCIF∙Q 










Risk Achievement (RA) GR =Q qi=1 -Q 

















Table 2.5:  Definitions of Various RIMs 
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2.2.2 Risk Importance Measures for Failures of Systems and Functions 
RIMs can also be used to evaluate the importance of failures of safety functions and 
systems. Functions appear in fault trees as gates. Systems can be common to several 
functions and several systems may affect the reliability of the function. 
In a way similar to components, when calculating the RIMs for functions or systems 
the corresponding gate is assumed failed or functioning based on the RIM used. 
Components represented by the basic events can be common to several functions, so the 
assumed failure of a gate should not affect basic events, but those are assumed to be at their 
nominal unavailability level. This is illustrated in Figure 2.6, where Function 1 (darkened) is 
failed. Systems do not share basic events, since a single component can only belong to a 
single system. Calculating the importance of functions requires a lot computing power since 
disabling a function requires recalculation of minimal cut sets. In PSA models with many 
functions this takes time and needs approximate methods for faster solving. 
Figure 2.6: Evaluating Functional Importance 
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2.3 Non-coherent Systems 
Fault trees are classified according to their logic function. If during fault tree 
construction only AND gates and OR gates are used, the resulting fault tree is defined as 
coherent. If NOT logic is used or directly implied, the resulting fault tree is non-coherent. 
The indicator  i is used to show the status of each component 
xi=  
1      if component i has failed
   0      if component i is working 
   
where i   1, 2,…, n, and n is the number of components in the system. 
The logic structure of the fault tree can be expressed by a structure function  . 
 =  
1      if component i has failed
   0      if component i is working 
   
 =  x ,      where     1,  2, …, n . 
According to the requirements of coherency [12], a structure function      is 
coherent if 
Each component i is relevant to the system, i.e. 
   0i,x    1i,x         for some  i     
     is increasing (non-decreasing) for each  i, i.e. 
  1i,x    0i,x         for some  i    
where 
   1i,x =  x1,…, xi-1, 1, xi+1,…,xn  
  0i,x =  x1,…, xi-1, 0, xi+1,…,xn   
The second condition means that the system condition does not change or 
deteriorate as the component deteriorates. If the system is non-coherent for component i, 
the system is in the failed condition when component i is working; and when component i 
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fails the system is restored to the non-failed condition. As a consequence of this property, 
system failure might occur due to the repair of a failed component, or for a failed system the 
failure of an additional component may give a successful outcome of system performance. 
The fault tree becomes coherent if the NOT logic can be eliminated from the fault tree 
structure. It should be noted that because the structure function of non-coherent system is 
non-monotonic, the cut sets are represented by prime implicant sets because of the 
complication of the system failure mode.  
2.3.1 A Simple Example of Non-coherency 
An example is made in [20] and [21]. Consider the example illustrated in Figure 2.7. 
Cars A and B are approaching a junction with lights on red, and should stop. Car C has the 
right of way and should proceed through the junction. Event A, B and C are considered: 
A: Car A fails to stop. 
B: Car B fails to stop. 
C: Car C fails to continue. 
 
Figure 2.7: Traffic Light System 
A collision at the crossroads can happen in two ways: 
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Car A fails to stop and hits car C which is moving. 
Car A stops but car B drives into the back of it. 
A fault tree representing causes of failure of the collision is shown in Figure 2.8. 
Working in a bottom-up way, the following logic expression is obtained 
Top= ∙C + ∙B 
where ‗+‘ is OR and ‗∙‘ is  ND. 
Therefore, { ∙ } and { ∙ } are prime implicants, as combinations of component 
conditions (working or failed) that are necessary and sufficient to cause system failure. This 
list is incomplete because there is one more failure mode for the system 
{ ∙ } 
i.e. if B fails to stop and C continues across the lights, it does not matter what A does 
– there will be a collision. 
Therefore, the full logic expression for the Top event is  
Top= ∙C + ∙B+B∙C  
which can be obtained by applying the consensus law 




Figure 2.8: Collision Fault Trees 
2.3.2 Non-coherent Systems In Real World 
While most of the systems in real world have coherent structure, some systems have 
non-coherent structure due to: 
1. The nature of the systems, such as the negative feedback loops and 
redundant loops [22]; 
2. The system failure under certain circumstances, such as the Gas Detection 
Systems presented as a case study in Section 5.2; 
3. The bad design of a system, as the occurrence of a non-coherent event, 
which causes or directly implies the system failure, has a rather high 
probability. 
The maintenance on non-coherent systems is definitely more complicated than those 
perfectly designed coherent systems. However, the FTA involving non-coherent 
components/events still needs attention. The accident at the Three Mile Island Unit 2 (TMI-
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2) nuclear power plant, for example, shows the fact that non-coherent events may cause 
severe consequences[23][24][25]. 
In the night-time hours preceding the accident, the TMI-2 reactor was running at 97 
percent of full power, while the companion TMI-1 reactor was shut down for refuelling. The 
chain of events leading to the partial core meltdown began at 4 a.m. EST on March 28, 1979, 
in TMI-2's secondary loop, one of the three main water/steam loops in a pressurized water 
reactor. The layout of TMI-2 is shown in Figure 2.9. 
 
Figure 2.9: Schematic Layout of TMI-2 
As a result of mechanical or electrical failure, condensate pump stopped running, 
followed immediately by the main feedwater pumps. This automatically triggered the turbine 
to shut down and the reactor to scram: control rods were inserted into the core and fission 
ceased. However, as the reactor continued to generate decay heat, and steam was no longer 
being used by the turbine due to the turbine trip, the steam generators no longer removed 
that heat from the reactor.  
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Once the secondary feedwater pump system failed, three auxiliary pumps activated 
automatically. However, because the valves had been closed for routine maintenance, the 
system was unable to pump any water. The pumps were activated manually eight minutes 
later, and manually deactivated between 1 and 2 hours later, as per procedure, due to 
excessive vibration in the pumps.  
Due to the loss of heat removal from the primary loop and the failure of the auxiliary 
system to activate, the primary side pressure began to increase, triggering the pilot-operated 
relief valve (PORV) at the top of the pressurizer to open automatically. The PORV should 
have closed again when the excess pressure had been released and electric power to the 
solenoid of the pilot was automatically cut, but instead the main relief valve stuck open due 
to a mechanical fault. The open valve permitted coolant water to escape from the primary 
system, and was the principal mechanical cause of the crisis that followed. 
Aside from human factors and emergency system issues in this event, the loss of heat 
removal from the primary loop, the failure of the auxiliary system were the main causes of 
the system breakdown; the other event that directly caused the crisis is the mechanical failure 




Loss of Heat Removal




Figure 2.10: TMI-2 Fault Tree 1 
Based on the description of the event, several sub-events are considered as follows: 
A: Condensate pump stops running; 
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B: Reactor is shut down; 
C: Valves in auxiliary system closed (for maintenance); 
D: Main valve of PORV stuck open 




Loss of Heat Removal
from the Primary Loop
Main Relief Valve
Stuck Open
A B B C
 
Figure 2.11: TMI-2 Fault Tree 2 
And it is minimized into the fault tree in Figure 2.12: 
System Failure
A B C D
 
Figure 2.12: TMI-2 Fault Tree 3 
Because the reactor was not shut down and still continued to generate heat, the 
inverse of the event B should be considered in the FTA. This is a typical case of non-
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coherent FTA and shows how the system is affected by a non-coherent event (B : Reactor 
not shut down). Obviously the coherent events are associated with the mechanical/electrical 
failure of components, which are the initiating events of the system failure; the non-coherent 
event is associated with the other faults revealed during the investigation, such as the bad 
design of the reactor control system‘s interface, human factor, etc. 
In reality, the closure of these valves was a violation of a key NRC rule, according to 
which the reactor must be shut down if all auxiliary feed pumps are closed for maintenance. 
This failure was later singled out by NRC officials as a key one, without which the course of 
events would have been very different. 
The accident at the Three Mile Island Unit 2 (TMI-2) nuclear power plant was the 
most serious in U.S. commercial nuclear power plant operating history, even though it led to 
no deaths or injuries to plant workers or members of the nearby community [24]. But it 
brought about sweeping changes involving emergency response planning, reactor operator 
training, human factors engineering, radiation protection, and many other areas of nuclear 
power plant operations. It also caused the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to 
tighten and heighten its regulatory oversight and brought attention to PSA approach in 
regulatory use, which makes it a watershed event in the history of nuclear industry. Resultant 
changes in the nuclear power industry and at the NRC had the effect of enhancing safety. 
2.3.3 Calculational Tools for Non-coherent Fault Tree Analysis 
The System unavailability can be hand calculated by using the method in [9]. When 
analyzing non-coherent fault trees, the Binary Decision Diagram (BDD) method is usually 
incorporated to overcome the difficulties in calculation. The BDD method has distinct 
advantages for quantifying a non-coherent fault tree. The methodology to determine the 
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prime implicants from the BDD structure is given in [26], and the calculation procedure is 
given in [27]. 
In this thesis, the fault trees are constructed using Relex Architect Software (Relex 
Fault Tree), which helps on calculating the most commonly used RIMs such as Birnbaum‘s 
Measure (BM), Criticality Importance Factor (CIF) and Fussell-Vesely Measure (FV). 
However, the other RIMs cannot be calculated using Relex software. Most of the 
calculations for various RIMs are done by hands with the help of spreadsheets in Excel. 
2.4 Maintenance Engineering 
Maintenance is required for almost every complex industrial installation to keep the 
equipment in adequate condition. An efficient and effective maintenance program plays a key 
role in reducing costs and improving safety. Different maintenance activities are utilized 
depending on the type of production process. 
At some industrial work, the aims are to repair equipment failures when this occurs; 
at others effort is taken to prevent failure and/or to minimize equipment downtimes. Thus 
maintenance is broadly classified to corrective and preventive maintenance; the former 
comprising activities such as inspection and replacement while the latter concerning fixing or 
replacing equipment in the event of failure [28]. The classification of maintenance activities is 




Figure 2.13: Different Types of Maintenance 
 Test and maintenance methodologies have evolved over the last several decades. 
Before the 1950s, maintenance was often performed whenever there was a component 
failure (corrective maintenance) [29]. Gradually, the plant availability, equipment life, plant 
safety, product quality, and cost were all incorporated into the requirements. Therefore, over 
time, preventive maintenance was developed [29][30][31] that could be further categorized 
into two types: Periodic Preventive Maintenance and Condition-Based Predictive 
Maintenance. The difference between the corrective and preventive maintenance can be 
shown in Figure 2.14. 
 Various aspects of maintenance have been investigated in nuclear power industry, 
where maintenance plays an importance role to reach a high level of performance and safety, 
which is generally required by NPP owners, regulatory authorities and the public.  
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Figure 2.14: Preventive and Corrective Maintenance 
Thus, various programs are developed for the purpose of improving the effectiveness 
of maintenance from both performance and safety view points, such as Reliability Centered 
Maintenance (RCM) and Risk-informed Maintenance. 
2.4.1 Reliability Centered Maintenance  
 Reliability Centered Maintenance (RCM) is a technique for developing a preventive 
maintenance (PM) program, which is based on the assumption that the inherent reliability of 
the equipment is a function of the design and the build quality. RCM is designed to balance 
the costs and benefits, to obtain the most cost-effective PM program [32].  
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RCM focuses on the most important functions of the system, while eliminating the 
inefficient and unnecessary maintenance activities, as the main objective of RCM is to reduce 
the maintenance cost. The maintainability consideration, which is supposed be considered 
during the early concept phase of system design, are usually delayed until it is too late to 
make significant changes. Detailed maintenance strategies should be established before the 
system is put into operation. 
The maintenance tasks considered in the RCM approach are all related to failures and 
functional degradation. The improvement of a system, which has no effects on the system 
functions, is outside the scope of RCM, but it should be integrated with the planning of 
RCM relevant tasks. 
 The RCM concept was originated within the aircraft industry [33], and then migrated 
through other industries with high reliability needs such as chemical, offshore oil and gas, etc. 
By the early 1990‘s, RCM had made its way to the utility industry via the nuclear industry, 
and it has proven useful in applications that all share some common characteristics, including 
systems where reliability is critical and where quantitative data regarding failures are limited.  
 Generally, the whole RCM analysis is usually carried out as a sequence of activities or 
steps as follows, while some of the steps are overlapping in time [32]: 
1. Study Preparation 
2. System Selection and Definition 
3. Functional Failure Analysis 
4. Critical Item Selection 
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5. Data Collection and Analysis 
6. Failure Mode Effect Criticality Analysis (FMECA) 
7. Selection of Maintenance Actions 
8. Determination of Maintenance Intervals 
9. Preventive Maintenance Comparison Analysis 
10. Treatment of Non-Critical Items 
11. Implementation 
12. In-Service Data Collection and Updating 
 On the other hand, the whole process is divided into four elements [34]: 
1. Planning and Preparation 
2. Initial RCM Analysis 
3. Implementation of Results 
4. Sustaining the Analysis 
2.4.2 Risk-informed Maintenance 
2.4.2.1 Risk-informed Decision Making Approach 
The insights and applications of PSA have made significant improvements to 
Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) safety, reliability, operational flexibility and economy. [35] Risk-
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informed Decision Making (RIDM) integrates insights from deterministic or traditional 
engineering safety analysis with insights from PSA application process. While much of 
RIDM experience is from NPP applications, the intent is to offer RIDM to the full range of 
nuclear facilities such as waste storage.  
The RIDM was originally used in nuclear community primarily to identify NPP 
severe accident vulnerabilities to prioritize mitigating alternatives, and to access operational 
events. It also had some input to regulatory rule making. However, a primary stimulus came 
in improving NPP technical specifications by demonstrating the safe and sometimes 
optimum extensions of allowed outage times and surveillance test intervals. 
Success in the area of technical specifications improvement led to applications in the 
areas of configuration risk analysis and management in a broader sense and to the analyses 
and optimization of maintenance, both at power and during outages. Numerous safety 
enhancements were revealed through the application of PSA. 
These successes led to additional successful applications, which included further 
rulemaking, in-service inspection, in-service testing, quality assurance, increasingly flexible 
technical sections, design, inspection, and regulatory oversight. While many applications 
received visibility because of their regulatory interfaces, additional applications afforded 
significant success in areas that were not addressed in the licensing basis, safety case, etc. 
Emerging applications in several countries are in the area of facility security.  
Improved nuclear safety includes improvements to the plant and to its programs and 
procedures, increased understanding of vulnerabilities, and increased understanding of high 
risk situations to avoid. Increased plant performance and economy include reduced personal 
radiation exposure as well as optimized fiscal considerations. 
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2.4.2.2 The Nuclear Industry’s Transition to Risk-informed Regulation 
The transition from a prescriptive regulatory structure to a more risk-informed 
approach of the United States nuclear industry occurred over a 20 yr period in which gradual 
changes were made in the fundamental regulations and to the approach to nuclear safety and 
operations. The regulatory changes are continuing even though the number is not huge.  The 
utilities that embraced risk informed operations made dramatic changes in the way they 
approached operations and outage management. Those utilities that used risk in operations 
showed dramatic improvement in safety based on Institute of Nuclear Power Operations 
(INPO) performance indicators. It was also shown that the use of risk did not negatively 
affect safety performance of the plants compared to standard prescriptive approaches. This 
was despite having greater flexibility in compliance to regulatory standards and the use of the 
newly instituted risk-informed reactor oversight process. The development of risk-informed 
regulation in the US and more details of the implementation strategies in the industry are 
addressed in [36]. 
Key factors affecting the successful transition to a more risk-informed approach to 
regulations and operations are:  
 Strong top management support and leadership both at the regulator and the 
utility;  
 Education and training in risk principles and PSA tools for engineers, 
operators and maintenance staff;  
 A slow and steady introduction of risk initiatives in areas that can show value 
to both the regulator and the industry;  
 A transparent regulatory foundation built around a safety goal policy, and  
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 The development of a strong safety culture at the utility to allow for more 
independence in safety compliance and risk management. 
However, there were several reluctance to use PSA in licensing decisions when 
WASH-1400 (The Rasmussen Report or the Reactor Safety Study) [12] was published and 
the process of creating risk-informed regulatory process began in 1970s [36]. The readiness 
of using risk in technical decision making was questioned because of the certain short 
comings in the treatment of uncertainties [37].  ccording to the ―Staff  ctions Regarding 
Risk  ssessment Review Group Report‖ in 1979 [38], the regulatory decision should not be 
solely based on PSA. In addition, the immaturity of PSA approach, the lack of industrial 
experience, the lack of expertise in methodology in NRC, result in the reluctance to 
implement PSA in licensing decisions. 
In 1979, the TMI accident (introduced in Section 2.3.2) changed the attractiveness of 
PSA, as the physical damage to the plant and economic damage to the owners was very large 
which prompt their need to better understand the risk of operation. The actions were taken 
in response to the event, such as the development of PSA for boiling water reactors (BWR), 
the development of Industry Degraded Core Rulemaking Program (IDCOR), etc. [36] 
The use of PSA for regulatory purposes was growing fast in 1980s. The risk insights 
were used in the development of many regulations such as the station Blackout Rule and 
Anticipated Transients without Scram Requirements in the late 1980s, the maintenance rule 




2.4.2.3 Optimized Maintenance through PSA 
A research program aimed at making optimum use of maintenance resources was 
launched in 1990 Electricité de France (EDF). The objective of this was to focus 
maintenance work on equipment which had a fundamental role in safety program and unit 
availability and maintenance cost [39]. In this approach, a new maintenance policy is likely to 
result in an evolution in the reliability and availability of the equipment. The impact of the 
new policy can be evaluated with PSA in order to achieve full optimization. Such approach is 





Extension of Risk Importance Measures to 
Non-coherent Systems  
3.1 Various Risk Importance Measures 
One of the major objectives from a PSA is to help focus attention on the most 
important systems when performing maintenance, namely risk-informed maintenance. This 
is particularly beneficial when resources are limited in practical applications.  To achieve this 
goal, Risk Importance Measures (RIMs) derived from PSA provides valuable information for 
risk-informed decision making. Through a RIM, a ranking of the components (or basic 
events) can be obtained. The components on the top of the list should receive most 
attention. This is important when resources and limited in order to reduce cost.  There are 
numerous RIMs defined in the open literature, and they have been applied in various 
applications. In this section, eight commonly used RIMs (Birnbaum‘s Measure, Criticality 
Importance Factor, Improvement Potential, Fussell-Vesely Measure, Risk Achievement, 
Conditional Probability, Risk Achievement Worth and Risk Reduction Worth) are 




3.1.1 Birnbaum’s Measure 
Birnbaum‘s Measure (BM) was introduced with the concept of importance and a 
probabilistic measure of component reliability in 1969 [50]. It is defined as the ratio of the 
component unreliability/unavailability to system unreliability/unavailability (denoted by Qsys); 
and it determines the maximum increase in risk when the given component is failed 
compared to when it is in a working state. It is also referred to as Partial Derivative (PD) in 
[18][41]. 
Mathematically, BM is obtained by partial differentiation of the system unavailability 
with respect to the probability of failure of the component. However, it has been represented 













S – structure function of the system  
e – given basic event 
Usys – system unavailability, i.e. Pr {S} 
qe – unavailability of the given component e 
BI=R xi=1 -R xi=0  [18] 
R(xi = 1) – the increased risk level with basic event i 
assumed to be failed 
R(xi = 0) – the decreased risk level with basic event i 





  [43] 
Oj1 – output of element j in failed state 
Oj0 – output of element j in functioning state 
Ixi
B=CDF xi=1 -CDF xi=0  [44] 
CDF(xi = 1) – the risk level with particular system is 
unavailable 










Qsys(t) – system unavailability; Pr {System is in a failed 
state at time t} 




  [45] 
Ri+ – overall model risk with the probability of basic 
event i  set to 1 
Ri- – overall model risk with the probability of basic 
event i  set to 0 
Table 3.1:  Definitions of Birnbaum’s Measure 
It can be seen in Table 3.1 that the expression of BM can also be defined as the 
difference between the risk level of the overall when the probability of basic event is set to 1 












=0                                       (3.1) 
In general, the value of BM represents the sensitivity coefficient of the risk measures 
to the probability of the given basic event, and provides one way of looking at the defence-
in-depth issue in a probabilistic sense [45]. BM does not explicitly indicate how likely the 
given basic event is to occur as the value of BM is usually independent of the actual 
unavailability of the given event; it can lead to assigning high importance to events that are 
very unlikely to occur and difficult to improve. 
3.1.2 Criticality Importance Factor  
Criticality Importance Factor (CIF) is defined as the probability that the given basic 
event has occurred, i.e. the failure of the given component is critical to the system. It takes 
into account the failure probability of the given basic event. Since BM is independent of the 
actual unavailability of the given event and can lead to assigning high importance to events 
that are unlikely to occur, CIF is derived from BM as to focus on events that are  not only 
critical to the top event but also are more likely to occur.  

























                                 (3.2) 
It is also referred to as Criticality Measure [42][46], Criticality Importance[18], or 
Fractional Contribution [47], in different studies. 
47 
 
3.1.3 Improvement Potential  
 Improvement Potential (IP) measures how much the system reliability increases if the 
given basic event was replaced by a perfect component, i.e. a component in a working state 
[42][48][49]. It is also referred to as Risk Reduction [18][50]. The mathematical definition of 
IP is based on BM and CIF: 
GIP=GBM∙qi=GCIF∙Qsys                                          (3.3) 
Since the unavailability of the overall system Qsys is constant, IP has the same functions when 
ranking the importance of basic events or components. 
3.1.4 Fussell-Vesely Measure 
 Fussell-Vesely Measure (FV) is defined as the probability that a given basic event has 
contributed to the basic risk level, assuming the system has failed. Mathematically, FV is the 
ratio of the probability of any cut set or prime implicant set containing the given event and 
the probability of the top event, i.e. the system unavailability. Thus, it assesses the 
contribution of the group in such a way that, any combination (Minimal Cut Sets, Prime 
Implicant Sets) that has a contribution from any one member of the group is included. It is 
commonly used as a risk reduction indicator. 









F(0) – risk level supposing that the unavailability 
associated with the basic event i is zero 
F – Basic event level 
FV=
{CDF base -CDF xi=0 }
CDF(base)
 [44] 
CDF(base) – the time averaged CDF 
CDF(xi = 0) – the risk level when particular 





R(base) – the present risk level 
R(xi = 0) – the decreased risk level with the basic 











R0 – base (reference) case overall model risk 
Ri- – overall model risk with the probability of 









np – total number of minimal cut sets or prime 
implicant sets 
Ck – minimal cut set k for coherent 
systems/prime implicant set k for non-coherent 
systems 
Qsys - system unavailability; Pr {System is in a 








Oj0 – output of element j in failed state 
O – output performance measure 
rj – performance reduction work 
Table 3.2:  Definitions of Fussell-Vesely Measure 
Since the risk equation can be represented in a linear equation: 
R Xi =aXi+b,  
49 
 












xi, when   i  . 
This equation indicates that FV is proportional to xi, which is the unavailability of 
component i [18].  
Although FV assesses the contribution of the group of basic events in such a way 
that any minimal cut set or prime implicant set that has a contribution from any one member 
of the group is included, it is not additive. Since FV is simply a ratio of contributors and does 
not involve assessing changes, it is an appropriate measure of group importance [45].  




                                                                    (3.4) 
FV is frequently adopted instead of CIF which can also be defined as the probability 
that a given basic event is contributing to the basic risk level. Although they are not 
equivalent to each other, they give similar results [51]. 
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3.1.5 Risk Achievement  
Risk Achievement (RA) measures the increase in risk of system failure if a given 
component fails. The expression is given in [18]: 
R =R xi=1 -R(base)      (3.5) 
where R(xi = 1) denotes the increase risk level without basic event xi or with basic 
event xi assumed failed and R(base) represents the present risk level. 
In this thesis, the expression of RA is written as: 
GR =Q qi=1 -Qsys                                                    (3.6) 
where Q(qi=1) denotes the system unavailability with event i assumed occurred. 
3.1.6 Conditional Probability 
Conditional Probability (CP) gives the value of the change in system unreliability (or 
risk) that involves the failure of the given basic event. The expression is given in [52]: 







        (3.7) 









=1)                                             (3.8) 
3.1.7 Risk Achievement Worth  
Risk Achievement Worth (RAW) is most commonly used as a measure of safety 
consideration and a risk achievement indicator. It is defined as the ‗worth‘ of the given basic 
event in ‗achieving‘ the present level of risk, and indicates the importance of maintaining the 
current level of reliability with respect to the failed event associated to corresponding 
components.  







+1, when   i           (3.9) 
The expression has shown that unlike FV, RAW does not represent the component 
itself as it seen to independent of the unavailability of the given basic event. Table 3.3 shows 











F(1) – the risk level supposing that the 
unavailability associated with the basic event i is 
set to 1 





CDF(xi = 1) – the risk level when particular 
system is unavailable 





R(xi = 1) – the increased risk level without basic 
event xi or with basic event xi assumed failed 






R0 – base (reference) case overall model risk 
Ri- – overall model risk with the probability of 
basic event i set to 0 







S – structure function of the system  
e – given basic event 
Usys – system unavailability, i.e. Pr{S} 





Oj1 – output of element j in failed state 
O – output performance measure 
Table 3.3:  Definitions of Risk Achievement Worth 
RAW is also called Risk Increase Factor as it measures the increase in system 
unreliability assuming the worst case of the failure of the given component [53]. It has been 
applied to systems made up of binary elements (i.e. elements that can be in either failed or 











                                                     (3.10) 
3.1.8 Risk Reduction Worth  
Risk Reduction Worth (RRW) measures the maximum decrease of the risk (system 
unavailability) by the improvement of the element associated with the given basic event 
considered [18][42][43]. In a different definition, RRW yields the ratio of the basic case 
model risk to the risk with the probability of the basic event set to be 0, i.e. the basic event 
does not happen; and it represents the maximum decrease in risk for an improvement to the 
element associated with the basic event [45]. For all intents and purposes, both of the above 
definitions are accurate to describe RRW. It can be used to select components that are the 
best candidates for efforts leading to improving system reliability [42]; and it has been 
applied to systems made of up of binary elements (i.e. elements that can be in either failed or 













F(0) – risk level supposing that the unavailability 
associated with the basic event i is zero 





CDF(base) – the time averaged CDF 
CDF(xi = 0) – the risk level when particular 





R(base) – the present risk level 
R(xi = 0) – the decreased risk level with the basic 







Ri+ – overall model risk with the probability of 
basic event i  set to 1 








S – structure function of the system  
e – given basic event 
Usys – system unavailability, i.e. Pr{S} 





Oj0 – output of element j in functioning state 
O – output performance measure 
Table 3.4:  Definitions of Risk Reduction Worth 






                                                             (3.11) 
where Q(qi=0) denotes the system unavailability with event i assumed not occurred. 
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3.2 Extension of Various Risk Importance Measures to Non-
coherent Systems 
Whether the fault tree is coherent or non-coherent is important to determine during 
FTA when coordinating maintenance activities. The non-coherency of the 
events/components in a fault tree varies the maintenance sequence and priority. Although 
this field has received much attention over the past 35 years, the majority of measures have 
been developed specifically for the analysis of coherent systems, and therefore have ranked 
component failures. Importance analysis of non-coherent systems is rather limited; it is 
generally inaccurate and misleading because importance is approximated using the measures 
developed for the analysis of coherent systems. 
3.2.1 The Extension of Birnbaum’s Measure to Non-coherent Systems 
In FTA, the probability of the top event in a coherent fault tree is a function of the 
probabilities of the occurred basic events. In a non-coherent fault tree however, the 
probability of the top event is a function of the probability of some basic events not 
occurring, which complicates the evaluation of RIMs.  
As introduced before, BM is defined as probability that component is critical to 
system failure. It is the fundamental probabilistic measure of importance and a central of 
many other measures such as CIF and IP.  
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In [21][54], BM for non-coherent fault trees is failure critical when the given basic 
event is coherent to the occurrence of the top event; and is repair critical when the negation 
of the given basic event is coherent to the occurrence of the top event, i.e. the component is 
non-coherent to the overall system. This is because not only the occurrence of a basic event 
but also the non-occurrence of the basic event can result in the occurrence of the top event 
in a fault tree. These two criticalities should be considered separately when analyzing a 
system because the given component can exist in only 1 state at any time. Thus the 
expression of BM,   M    i 1 -   i   , is not applicable when extending to non-coherent 
systems because if BM of component i was written as    
i
 1 -   
i
   , BM of its negation 
i   is    
i
   -   
i
 1 , which is meaningless in ranking. On the other hand, BM is also 
calculated from the system unavailability function, Qsys(i), which is obtained using the 






      (3.12) 
As Component i is failure critical if the system is working, but the system fails if the 
component fails. Thus the probability that component is failure critical is the probability that 
the system is in a working state such that the failure of the component causes at least 1 
prime-implicant set containing event to occur. This probability is calculated by obtaining the 
probability that at least 1 prime-implicant set containing event exists and then dividing this 
probability by the unavailability of component i. [48] 






=i∙ +i  ∙B+C     (3.13) 
The three terms represent, respectively, 
 those products involving the failure of the given component, 
 those products involving the repair of the given component, 
 those products for which component is irrelevant. 
Thus the probability that the given component is failure critical is: 
Gi




=Pr{ }                                     (3.14) 
 Similarly, the probability that component i is repair critical is the probability that the 
system is in a working state such that the repair of component i causes at least 1 prime-
implicant set containing event i   to occur. This is calculated by obtaining the probability that 
at least 1 prime implicant set containing event i   exists and then dividing this probability by 
the availability of component i. 
Gi
BM  p =
Pr{i   ∙B}
p
i
=Pr{B}                                             (3.15) 
Therefore, the failure and repair criticalities can be calculated separately by 








                                                        (3.16) 
Gi




                                                        (3.17) 
3.2.2 The Extension of Criticality Importance Factor to Non-coherent 
Systems 
The Component Importance Factor (CIF) is defined as: the probability that a 
component is critical to the system and has failed, weighted by the system unavailability. It is 
one of the most importance RIMs that has been developed from BM. When analyzing a non-
coherent fault tree, then component failure and component repair can cause system failure; 
thus the expression for failure importance and repair importance must be obtained. [21] 
Because CIF is defined based on BM, the failure criticality and repair criticality can be 
written separately as:  
Gi





                                              (3.18) 
Gi





                                             (3.19) 
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3.2.3 The Extension of Improvement Potential to Non-coherent Systems 
The Improvement Potential (IP) represents how much the system reliability increases 
if the given basic event is replaced by a component in a working state. Mathematically, it is 
the product of BM and the given basic event probability, or the product of CIF and the 
system unavailability. And because the system unavailability remains constant, IP and CIF 
function identically in ranking for maintenance priority of components. Thus the extension 
of IP to non-coherent systems is similar to CIF, which consists of failure and repair criticality 
and they are written separately as: 
Gi
IP  q  =Gi
BM  q ∙q
i
                                              (3.20) 
Gi
IP  p  = Gi
BM  p ∙p
i
                                             (3.21) 
3.2.4 The Extension of Fussell-Vesely Measure to Non-coherent 
Systems 
The Fussell-Vesely measure (FV) of component importance [16] is concerned with 
component failures contributing to the occurrence of the top event. As introduced before, 
FV is defined as the probability that a minimal cut set containing the basic event i causes the 





FV  q =
Pr{ Ck}k|i k
Qsys
                                                        (3.22) 
And the FV repair importance can be defined as the prime implicant set(s) containing 
the negation of the basic event i, it can be written as: 
Gi
FV  p =
Pr{ Ck}k|i  k
Qsys
                                                 (3.23) 
3.2.5 The Extension of Risk Achievement to Non-coherent Systems 
The Risk Achievement (RA) is defined as the increase in risk of system failure if a 
given component fails. According to the definition, RA is a measure based on the 
assumption of the given event already occurred. However, when dealing with the non-
coherent event, which the event itself is also coherent to the top event, i.e. i and its negation 
i   both exist in the function of the top event, the computation of RA is more complicated. 
Since a given event can exit in only 1 state at any time, when the probability of the event is 
set to be 1 (qi = 1), the negation is set to be 0 (pi = 0) and vice versa. The RA failure 
importance is written as: 
 Gi








                           (3.24) 
And the RA repair importance can be written as: 
Gi








                 (3.25) 
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To check the feasibility of the extension, consider the non-coherent system used in 
[55] and [20], the Boolean expression for the top event is: 
T=a∙b+a∙c+b∙c 




























The proposed extension can be used to calculate the failure and repair importance of any 
event. The failure and repair importance of RA for each of the event are calculated from 
(3.24) and (3.25): 
Ga














































The system unavailability Qsys remains constant at 0.034105. The results of RA measure for 
the four events are: 
Event RA Ranking 
a 0.01510238 2 
b 0.94687177 1 
c -0.02812487 4 
c 0.00043564 3 
Table 3.5: The Result Obtained from the Example 
The exhaustive tabular approach [54] can be used to check the feasibility of RA 
measure:  
Consider a system with n components; the system state can then be expressed in terms of the 
component states. It is possible to determine whether a component is critical to system 
failure, given the states of the remaining n-1 components. There are 2n-1 possible states of the 
other n-1 components. By identifying the critical situations for component i and summing 
their probabilities of occurrence, one can calculate the probability that component i is critical 
to system failure. Thus, Table 3.6 identifies the critical states for each of the three 
components. Table 3.7 records the sum of the critical situations for each event, the 
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W W No W W Yes (F) W W No 
W F Yes (R) W F No W F Yes (F) 
F W Yes (F) F W Yes (F) F W No 
F F No F F No F F Yes (F) 
W = working 
F = failed 
Table 3.6: Possible and Critical States for the Events 
 
Event 
Sum of Critical 
Situation 
Expected Results Rank 
a pb∙qc+qb∙qc=qc 1.52534 10-2 2 
b pa∙pc+qa∙pc=pc 0.84747 1 
c qa∙pb 0.00952 4 
c pa∙qb 0.03808 3 
Table 3.7: Expected Results 
The ranking result obtained using the tabular approach is the same as the result 
obtained using the proposed equations.  
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3.2.6 The Extension of Conditional Probability to Non-coherent 
Systems 
The Conditional Probability (CP) gives the value of the change in system unreliability 
(or risk) that involves the failure of the given basic event, i.e. the system unavailability with 
the given event assumed to be occurred. 
Mathematically, CP has the same function with RA as the original system 
unavailability Qsys remains constant. Thus the failure importance and repair importance of CP 
can be written according to the extension of RA: 
Gi






=0)                                      (3.26) 
Gi






=0)                                      (3.27) 
The feasibility of this extension can be proved using the method in section 3.2.5. 
3.2.7 The Extension of Risk Achievement Worth to Non-coherent 
Systems 
In the mathematical definition of Risk Achievement Worth (RAW), the numerator is 
identical to CP while the denominator is simply Qsys. As Qsys remains constant, the failure 




R W  q  = 
Qsys(qi=1, pi=0) 
Qsys
                                     (3.28) 
Gi
R W  p  = 
Qsys(pi=1, qi=0) 
Qsys
                                     (3.29) 
The feasibility of this extension can be proved using the method in section 3.2.5. 
3.2.8 The Extension of Risk Reduction Worth to Non-coherent Systems 
The Risk Reduction Worth (RRW) yields the ratio of the system unavailability to the 
risk with the probability of the basic event set to 0. Based on the mathematical definition of 











-Pr{ Ck}k|i k ,  




















 , which is why 
both RRW and FV are referred to as risk reduction indicator. In this case, the failure and 
repair criticality of RRW can be written respectively as: 
 Gi
RRW  q =
Qsys
Qsys-Pr{ Ck}k|i k
                                          (3.32) 
Gi
RRW  p =
Qsys
Qsys-Pr{ Ck}k|i  k
                                          (3.33) 
However, equation (3.32) and (3.33) have avoided the condition that if the probability of the 
given event is set to be 0, its negation should be set to 1 as one component can exist in only 
1 state at any time. According to (3.11), the failure and repair criticality of RRW can be 
defined as: 
Gi
RRW  q  = 
Usys
Qsys(qi= 0, pi= 1)
          (3.34) 
Gi
RRW  p  = 
Usys
Qsys(pi= 0, qi= 1)
          (3.35) 
The definition given in (3.34) and (3.35) obviously distinguishes RRW from FV in 
the evaluation for non-coherent systems, and also makes the evaluation of RRW more 





Categorization of Various Risk Importance 
Measures  
4.1 Overview 
Risk Importance Measures (RIMs) provide information that can be extracted from 
PSA. Components within a system can be ranked with respect to each specific criterion 
defined by each RIM, while rankings given by RIMs can be used to aid decision-making in 
PSA. The process is called risk-informed maintenance when they are implemented in 
maintenance activities. Important components that appear on the top of the list generally 
receive the most attention. This is extremely important in order to achieve the maximum 
benefit with limited resources.  
Maintenance are generally classified into two major categories—corrective 
maintenance and preventive maintenance [41]. Corrective maintenance is performed when 
there is a component or system failure. This is not always preferred and more proactive 
actions are desired. Therefore, time-based periodic preventive maintenance and condition-
based predictive maintenance are desired. For both types of maintenance, resources are often 
limited in real applications due to budget restriction or lead time required for component 
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enquiry. The objective of risk-informed maintenance is to direct the maintenance effort 
towards the area that deserves the most attention.  
On the other hand, RIMs can be classified into two major categories: risk significant 
measures and safety significant measures. Among the most popular RIMs introduced/used 
in numerous literatures, CIF, FV and RRW belong to the risk significant measures, while BM, 
RA and RAW are used as safety significant measures. This section will use one representative 
from each category, the CIF for risk significant measures and the RAW for safety significant 
measures, to investigate their applications in risk-informed maintenance. 
Although most engineering systems are coherent, some do present the non-coherent 
feature. In a non-coherent system, if a component functions, the overall system fails. On the 
other hand, if the same component fails, the overall system actually resides in a better state. 
This contradicts common sense. However, it does happen due to various reasons, either 
poor design or the nature of the system. There have been many examples of non-coherent 
systems and the most comprehensive list can be found in [56]. Results applicable for 
coherent systems cannot always be extended to non-coherent systems [57]. This section 
investigates whether the conclusion regarding risk-informed maintenance for coherent 
systems are applicable to non-coherent systems [58]. 
4.2 Risk Significance and Safety Significance 
The ranking of structures, systems and components (SSCs) with respect to risk 
significance (RS) and safety significance (SS) is one of the principal activities in PSA. Risk 
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significance and safety significance are regarded as complementary ways of identifying the 
role of SSCs in determining risks.  
There are 8 Risk Importance Measures (RIMs) introduced in Chapter 3. In order to 
apply them correctly, it is important to understand the fundamental meaning and identify the 
applicable area(s) for them. In the area of risk-informed maintenance, if one importance 
measure that provides insights for corrective maintenance is used for preventive maintenance, 
resources may be misplaced. This section investigates this issue by classifying the risk 
importance measures into two major categories—risk significant measures and safety 
significant measures. Two representatives from each category, CIF as a representative for 
risk significant measures and RAW as a representative for safety significant measures, are 
discussed in detail below. Simple series systems and parallel systems are used to demonstrate 
the basic ideas first. A more complicated system with a repeated basic event(s) in the minimal 
cut sets or prime implicant sets follows. If all of them occur, the top event occurs.  
4.2.1 Risk Significance 
Risk significance is easier to define and understand in an operational sense. An 
individual SSC can be identified as being risk-significant if it were demonstrated that its 
failure or unavailability contributes significantly to measures of risk [59].  
Risk significant measures represent which component most likely caused a system 
failure. This section uses a simple series system to clarify this idea, while CIF is used as a 
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representative of risk significant measures since it is one of the most widely used RIMs. The 
definition of CIF was presented in Section 3.1.2. 










                                                (4.1) 
ba
 
Figure 4.1: A Simple Series System 
Figure 4.1 shows two components, a and b, connected in series. If any one of the 
components fails, the system will fail. The question is which component is most likely to fail 
first so as to result in a system failure.  The answer can be obtained through the CIF of these 
two components. The component that has a higher CIF should be the one that needs to be 











                                                (4.2) 
















                                              (4.3) 
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, then    F       F   , and vice 
versa. This implies that if the CIF of component a is smaller than that of component b, the 
latter is most likely to fail first so as to result in a system failure.  
To demonstrate the use of risk significant measure in a complex system, suppose a 
system has two cut sets, {a, b} and {a, c}. Figure 4.2 shows the corresponding fault tree of 
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                                       (4.8) 
It can be shown from (4.6)-(4.8) that 
GCIF a >GCIF c >GCIF b  
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Figure 4.2: A Complex System 
The result implies that when the system fail, the first component that needs to be 
checked is component a, followed by component c and b. This makes common sense because 
component a appears in both of the cut sets. Since component c has a higher unavailability 
than component b, it is more likely to also have failed and needs to be checked next. It 
should be noted that the ranking of criticality importance factor is not always compliant with 
component unavailability, as opposed to the statements in [18]. In this case, although 
component a has the lowest unavailability, it ranks high in terms of its CIF. This is due to the 
configuration of the system and the position that component a takes in the system.   
4.2.2 Safety Significance 
Safety significance is conceptually considered as being related to the level of 
prevention required for the SSCs in the system. The safety significant SSCs are captured by 
identifying the levels of ―defence-in-depth‖ of the SSCs. The term ―defence-in-depth”, 
which is widely used in the nuclear industry, is used here to represent how well the overall 
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system is protected against the failure of a single component. The lower is the ―defence-in-
depth‖ for a component; the higher is the effect of the component failure on the overall 
system availability.  
Safety significant measures represent the level of ―defence-in-depth‖ of a system with 
respect to the failure of a component in the system. Thus the information provided by safety 
significant measures can be used to guide preventive maintenance, which is performed 
before the system has failed. The goal is to increase the level of defence-in-depth against the 
failure of a component, either by shortening the inspection interval, or adding another layer 
of redundancy, etc. This section uses a simple parallel system to clarify this idea. Series 
systems are not considered since there is no defence-in-depth in a series system because any 
component failure will result in a system failure in a series system. RAW is used as a 
representative of safety significant measures.  The definition of RAW was presented in 









                                                     (4.9) 




Figure 4.3: A Simple Parallel System 
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The system will not fail when only one component fails. The question is which 
component failure will put the system in a more dangerous position.  The answer can be 
obtained through the RAW. The component with the higher RAW has a lower level of 
defense-in-depth and its failure affects the system unavailability more severely. When 
performing preventive maintenance, more resources should be allocated to improve the level 
of defence-in-depth of that component. This is proved as follows. 




                                                     (4.10) 




                                                     (4.11) 
where  
 
 is the unavailability of component a, and  
 
 is the unavailability of component b. 




, then, RAW(a) > RAW(b) 
and vice versa. This implies that if the RAW of component a is higher, it has a lower level of 
defence-in-depth, which means more resources should be allocated to it during the 
preventive maintenance activities. 
To demonstrate the use of safety significant measures in a complex system, consider 
the complex system introduced in Section 4.2.1. The fault tree diagram is shown in Figure 
4.2. The RAWs of all components in the system are calculated as follows: 
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The results can be interpreted as follows: suppose component a fails, the fault tree of 
the system shown in Figure 4.2 is simplified (Figure 4.4). The unavailability of the system in 





Figure 4.4: System Fault Tree with Component a Assumed Failed 
Similarly, suppose component b fails, the fault tree of the system in Figure 4.2 









Figure 4.5: System Fault Tree with Component b Assumed Failed 
The fault tree in Figure 4.5 is not minimized. Therefore, it is further reduced to 
Figure 4.6 to obtain the minimal cut set(s). In this case, the result is very simple as the 
simplified figure only contains component a.  
 
Figure 4.6: Final System Fault Tree with component b assumed failed 
The unavailability of the system in Figure 4.6 is exactly the numerator of RAW(b), 
Similar results can be obtained for component c. If the unavailability of the system in Figure 
a
Fig. 6 Final system fault tree with 





4.4 is higher than that of the system shown in Figure 4.6, which is most probably the case, 
component a has the worst defence-in-depth and RAW(a) ranks the highest. Component b 
and c have the same level of defence-in-depth. Thus they have the same RAW, i.e. RAW(b) = 
RAW(c). When performing preventive maintenance before the system fails, these results 
should be taken into consideration. Resources should first be allocated to increase the level 
of defence against the failure of component a. 
4.3 Classification of Risk Importance Measures for Risk-
informed Maintenance 
Besides CIF and RAW, there were six important risk importance measures (RIMs) 
presented in Chapter 3. The purpose of this section is to classify them into different 
categories. The definition of various RIMs was presented in section 3 and the mathematical 








































Improvement Potential (IP) GIP=GBM∙qi=GCIF∙Qsys 





Risk Achievement (RA) GR =Q qi=1 -Qsys 



























Table 4.1: The Definition of Various RIMs 
Following the analysis described in Section 4.2, the eight RIMs are used in both 
parallel systems; the results are shown in Table 4.2 and Table 4.3. The analysis on a complex 

































































GFV a =GFV(b) 
 
RRW N/A N/A 
RA 
 
GR  a =qb-Q 
GR  b =qa-Q 
 















GR W a >GR W(b) 
CP 
 
GCP a =qb 
GCP b =qa 
 
GCP a >GCP(b) 



















GBM a =1-qb 
GBM b =1-qa 
 

























































GRRW b >GRRW(a) 
RA 
 
GR  a =0-Q 
GR  b =0-Q 
 













GR W a =GR W(b) 
CP 
 
GCP a =1 
GCP b =1 
 
GCP a =GCP(b) 




















GBM a =qb+qc-qb∙qc 
GBM b =qa-qaqc=qa 1-qc  
GBM c =qa-qaqb=qa 1-qb  
 



































































































GRRW a >GRRW c >GRRW(b) 
RA 
GR  a =qb+qc-qb∙qc-Q 
GR  b =qa-Q 
GR  c =qa-Q 
 





















































GCP a =qb+qc 
GCP b =qa 
GCP c =qa 
 
















Table 4.4: Comparison of Different RIMs on a Complex System 
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The ranking results for CIF, IP, FV and RRW are identical. It can be seen that these 
measures are not very applicable in parallel systems. All four RIMs have common ground in 
a series system in that the component which has higher unavailability ranks higher than those 
with lower unavailability. This has categorized them as risk significant measures as they 
represent which component most likely caused a system failure. They also provide 
information to guide corrective maintenance. This also explains why they cannot be used in a 
parallel system, because all the components are failed if the system was assumed to be failed. 
The result of CIF shows that the ranking of risk significance is not always compliant 
with component unavailability, but also depends on the configuration of the system fault tree 
and the position that the component takes in the system. The result of IP is always the same 
as CIF because the unavailability of the system Q is constant. As of FV, the ranking result is 
identical to those of CIF and IP as well. However, since FV only compares the importance 
between different minimal cut sets, the data results are slightly different as FV does not 
subtract the redundancy in the numerator. The RRW also gives same ranking results as the 
other three. However, if one basic event /component existed in every minimal cut set, its 
RRW tends to be positively infinitive, i.e. the more cut sets it appears to belong to, the 
smaller the denominator of the RRW, and the greater the RRW value. 
As RA includes the assumption of the failure of the give component ( 
i
 1), it can be 
a reference of the measure of defence-in-depth. The RAW, CP shows identical results as RA, 
which means they all represent the level of defence-in-depth of a system with respect to the 
unavailability of a component in the system. This has concluded that all three (RA, RAW, CP) 
can be considered safety significant measures which are applicable for preventive 
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maintenance. On the other hand, BM is also considered a safety significant measure because 
mathematically, it is independent of the unavailability of the given component. Unlike the 
other safety significant measures, BM gives different values for components with same 
situations in series. 
 The eight importance measures can be categorized with respect to risk significance 
and safety significance and they are shown in the table below.  
RIM Risk Significance Safety Significance 
BM ○ ● 
CIF ● ○ 
IP ● ○ 
FV ● ○ 
CP ○ ● 
RAW ○ ● 
RRW ● ○ 
RA ○ ● 




4.4 The Application of RIMs in Non-coherent Systems 
Extra attention should be brought to the use of extended RIMs on non-coherent 
systems. The extensions are presented in Section 3.2 and they are listed in Table 4.6. 
RIM Extension to Non-coherent Systems 
Birnbaum‘s Measure (BM) 
Gi




                                                         
Gi




                                                         
Criticality Importance Factor (CIF) 
Gi





                                               
Gi





                                             
Improvement Potential (IP) 
Gi
IP  q  =Gi
BM  q ∙q
i
                                              
Gi
IP  p  = Gi
BM  p ∙p
i
                                             
Fussell-Vesely Measure (FV) 
Gi
FV  q =
Pr{ Ck}k|i k
Qsys
             
Gi
FV  p =
Pr{ Ck}k|i  k
Qsys
                                             
Risk Achievement (RA) 
Gi



















Conditional Probability (CP) 
Gi






=0)                                       
Gi






=0)                                       
Risk Achievement Worth (RAW) 
Gi
R W  q  = 
Qsys(qi=1,  pi=0) 
Qsys
                                      
Gi
R W  p  = 
Qsys(pi=1,qi=0) 
Qsys
                                      
Risk Reduction Worth (RRW) 
Gi























Table 4.6: The Extended RIMs to Non-coherent Systems 
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Consider a non-coherent system with two prime implicant sets: {a, c} and {b, 













a c b c
 
Figure 4.7: Non-coherent Fault Tree 1 





=0.2 , and q
c
=0.3 . It should be noted these numbers are not 
realistic and they are used for demonstration purposes only. Based on the 
mathematical definition of CIF,   
Ga
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CIF  q  =0.176 
Gb
CIF  q  =0.824 
Gc
CIF  q =0.176 
Gc
CIF  p =0.824 
It can be seen that the CIF for component b and the repair importance of 
CIF for component c are equivalent and rank the highest. This is expected because 
when the system fails, it is more likely that the prime implicant {b, c } has occurred. 
Thus, when system failure occurs, the first step should be checking whether 
component c is functioning and component b has failed. If this is the case, 
component b should be repaired. This should restore the system to a working state.  
Using RAW as the safety significant RIM on the same non-coherent system 
example,  
Ga
R W  q  = 
Qsys(qa=1) 
Qsys




R W  q  = 
Qsys(qb=1) 
Qsys
=4.118                                     (4.20) 
Gc
R W  q  = 
Qsys(qc=1,  pc=0) 
Qsys
=0.588                              (4.21) 
Gc
R W  p  = 
Qsys(pc=1,qc=0) 
Usys
=1.176                             (4.22) 
Therefore,  
Gb
R W  q >Ga
R W  q >Gc
R W  p >Gc
R W  q  
This result shows that the system has the lowest defence-in-depth against failure of 
component b, then a, then the repair of component c, then the failure of component c. To 










For this fault tree, when component a fails, the system fails regardless 
whether component c is failed or working. Therefore, the fault tree can be further 






Figure 4.9: Simplified Fault Tree for Figure 4.8 
 












Similarly, when component a fails, the system fault tree becomes as shown in 









Figure 4.10: System Fault Tree Assuming Component a Fails 
 
This fault tree can be further simplified to Figure 4.11.  
 
Figure 4.11: Simplified Fault Tree for Figure 4.10 
 

















When component c works, the system fault tree is shown in Figure 4.12. This 













Figure 4.13: Simplified Fault Tree for Figure 4.12 
 
When component c works, the prime implicant set {a,c} will not occur. The 








When component c fails, the system fault tree is shown in Figure 4.14. This 














Figure 4.15: Simplified Fault Tree for Figure 4.14 
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As can be seen, As can be seen, Q(qc=1)>Q(qa=1)>Q(pc=1)>Q(qc=1), This 
means the system has higher to lower defence-in-depth in the order of assuming qc=1, 
pc=1, qa=1, qb=1. Using the same method to demonstrate the use of other RIMs on 
the same system, the results are shown in Table 4.7. To generalize the results, the 
probability of   (pc) are assumed to be much greater than the probability of event a, b 
and c.  
Prime implicant sets: {a, c} {b, c } 
RIM Results Notes 
BM 
GBM a =qc 
GBM b =pc 
GBM c =qa 




































GCIP c =qb∙pc 
The ranking results should be identical 
































The data calculated should be identical 
to CIF, so is the ranking results. 
 
RA 
GR  a =qc+qb∙pc-Q 
GR  b =qa∙qc+pc-Q 
GR  c =qa-Q as when qc=0,  pc=0 
GR  c =qb-Q as when pc=0,  qc=0 
It can only be concluded that   and   
depend on the unavailability of a and b, 
the ranking of a and b according to RA 









































































GRRW b >GRRW(c ), GRRW a >GRRW(c) 
Table 4.7: Demonstration of various RIMs on the Non-coherent System 
The demonstrated results have shown that CIF, IP and FV, which are 
categorized as risk significant measures, have identical results in a non-coherent 
system. CIF and IP have somewhat the same meaning as Qsys is constant. Unlike FV, 
CIF and IP are not solely comparing the importance between different minimal cut 
sets or prime implicant sets. This may result in some slight differences in more 
complicated systems. However, due to the result, we can say all of the three have 
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ranked components with respect to risk significance in non-coherent systems because 
{b,   } is usually more likely to occur than {a, c} in a failed system. 
The ranking results for RRW are different from CIF, IP and FV in a non-
coherent system. The result shows that the RRW in a given component depends on 
those events exist in the prime implicant set(s) which include the negation of the 
given component, but not the negation of the given component itself. For example, 
in a non-coherent system in Figure 4.16: 
Top event
a b b c
 
Figure 4.16: Non-coherent Fault Tree 2 
 
The RRW of component b is  
 
   
 
 
, which depend on the component c as c 
belongs to prime implicant set {  , c} which consists of c and the negation of b; the 
RRW of    is 
 
   
 
 
, which is dependent of component a as a belongs to {a, b} which 
includes the inverse of   . This means unlike the other risk significant measures, RRW 
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is not relevant to the unavailability of the given component itself. Thus in the real 
non-coherent systems, FV, CIF and IP are more applicable. 
The non-coherency of components makes the system more complicated. For 
example, when a measure includes an assumption of component failure, its negation 
should be assumed working (when   
 
 1 ,  
 
  ). It is still possible to use RA to 
measure safety significance in non-coherent system as it always includes the 
assumption of component failure (  
 
 1 . However, the expression of RAW, 
         i  
 
   
∙ 
i
, is not applicable for non-coherent systems due to the uncertainty of non-
coherent components. The other expression of RAW, 




   
,  should be applied 
when dealing with the non-coherent components; while CP goes with    
i
 1  as well 
due to the same reason. This makes RA, RAW and CP provide same ranking results 
in non-coherent systems. 




GBM a =qc 
GBM b =pc 
GBM c =qa 
GBM c =qb 
 
GR  a =qc+qb∙pc-Q 
GR  b =qa∙qc+pc-Q 
GR  c =qa-Q 
GR  c =qb-Q 
Table 4.8: The Comparison of Results of BM and RA for the Non-coherent System 
BM can still be considered a safety significant measure as it is totally 
independent of the unavailability of the given component. However, because BM is 
the partial derivative of the given component, it considers the negation of a 
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component (the non-coherent component) as an independent component. If BM of 
component i was written as    
i
 1 -   
i
   , BM of its negation is 
   
i
   -   
i
 1  - which is meaningless in ranking. As a result, RA, RAW and CP 
are more applicable and provide useful information with respect to safety significance 






5.1 The Application of Non-coherent Fault Tree Analysis on a 
Steam Generator Level Control System 
5.1.1 Steam Generator Level Control System  
In a typical CANDU Nuclear Power Plant (NPP), the Steam Generator Level 
Control System (SGLCS) adjusts the feedwater flow in response to changes of inventory of 
light water in the steam generators. The diagram in Figure 5.1 [60] shows the main pieces of 
equipment typical for a CANDU High Pressure Feedwater system, which also shows a 
typical set of steam generator level control valves along with steam generator feed pumps. 
The level in each steam generator is controlled individually. Because of safety, range of 
control and maintenance considerations, each steam generator has a set of several control 




Figure 5.1: Steam Generator Feed Pumps and Level Control Valves 
5.1.2 Demonstration of Non-coherent Fault Tree Analysis on the SGLCS 
Under low power conditions, or if the flow measurements are not available, the 
SGLCS can be operated as a single element controller (Figure 5.2). In the case of One 
Element Level Control, the set point is the desired steam generator level, which is compared 
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with the measured level. The level error is computed as the difference between the level set-
point and the actual (measured) level. The resultant controller signal is fed to the feedwater 
control valve‘s actuator, which alter the valve opening and hence the flow of feedwater to the 
steam generator [50].  
 
Figure 5.2: One Element Control of SGLCS 
In order to analyze the level control system, we developed a simplified level control 
system which was developed, only includes pump, vessel, sensor, controller and valves 
(Figure 5.3). 
In this system, liquid is fed to the vessel by the pump and the inlet flow is controlled 
by the inlet valve. A level sensor is used to measure the level of the liquid. If the liquid level 
exceeds a specified level, a signal ―liquid level in the vessel is high‖ will be sent by the sensor. 
Upon receiving the signal, the level controller will send a command to the inlet control valve 





 Figure 5.3: Simplified Level Control System 
Assuming:  
i. The outlet valve is stuck closed and fails to let the liquid outflow from the vessel 
(event A) and the level sensor generates a spurious signal indicating that the liquid 
level is low (event B); 
ii. The outlet valve is stuck closed and fails to let the liquid outflow from the vessel 
(event A) and the level controller fails to respond to the signal from the level sensor 
(event C); 
iii. The level sensor generates a spurious signal indicating that the liquid level in the 
vessel is low (event B) and the level sensor controller responds correctly to the signal 
from the level sensor (event  ). 
These failure modes are assumed to be the only prime implicants of this system. The 
three prime implicant sets are: {A, B}, {A, C} and {B,  }. Figure 5.4 shows the fault tree 




Figure 5.4: Example System Structure in Fault Tree 
The Boolean expression obtained from the prime implicants is: 
T =  B +  C + BC  
Because the availability of the component C ( 
 
 or  
 
) has the greatest value among 
the four in most cases, six situations should be considered during our analysis; thus six sets 
of component failure parameters (Table 5.1) are designed and used to measure the 
importance of the components in the system. The data set to the components however, are 
not realistic and only made up for demonstration in this case. 
e 
set 1 set 2 
qe pe qe pe 
A 5.00E-04 1.00E+00 1.00E-04 1.00E+00 
B 1.00E-04 1.00E+00 5.00E-04 1.00E+00 
C 9.00E-04 9.99E-01 9.00E-04 9.99E-01 
C  9.99E-01 9.00E-04 9.99E-01 9.00E-04 
e 
set 3 set 4 
qe pe qe pe 
A 9.00E-04 9.99E-01 9.00E-04 9.99E-01 
B 5.00E-04 1.00E+00 1.00E-04 1.00E+00 
C 1.00E-04 1.00E+00 5.00E-04 1.00E+00 
C  1.00E+00 1.00E-04 1.00E+00 5.00E-04 
e 
set 5 set 6 
qe pe qe pe 
A 1.00E-04 1.00E+00 5.00E-04 1.00E+00 
B 9.00E-04 9.99E-01 9.00E-04 9.99E-01 
C 5.00E-04 1.00E+00 1.00E-04 1.00E+00 
C  1.00E+00 5.00E-04 1.00E+00 1.00E-04 
Table 5.1: Failure/Repair Parameters of the Example System 
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The risk importance measures (RIMs) of components for the six sets of data are 
calculated based on the mathematical models introduced in Section 3, and ranked 
accordingly in Table 5.2-5.13. The calculations are done by hands and Excel as this is a 
simple non-coherent system. Table 5.2-5.7 shows the results calculated for data sets 1~6 
accordingly with respect to risk significance. Table 5.8-5.13 shows the results calculated for 
data sets 1-6 accordingly with respect to safety significance. 
e q FV CIF IP RRW 
A 5.000E-04 4.484E-03 4.484E-03 4.500E-07 1.005E+00 
B 1.000E-04 9.955E-01 9.955E-01 9.991E-05 2.230E+02 
C 9.000E-04 4.483E-03 4.483E-03 4.500E-07 1.004E+00 
C  9.991E-01 9.950E-01 9.950E-01 9.986E-05 2.007E-01 
ranking C >C>A>B B>C >A>C B>C >A>C B>C >A>C B>A>C>C  
sequential 
N/A B→C → →C B→C → →C B→C → →C B→ →C→C  order for  
maintenance 





e q FV CIF IP RRW 
A 1.000E-04 1.801E-04 1.801E-04 9.000E-08 1.000E+00 
B 5.000E-04 9.998E-01 9.998E-01 4.996E-04 5.552E+03 
C 9.000E-04 1.800E-04 1.800E-04 8.996E-08 9.993E-01 
C  9.991E-01 9.997E-01 9.997E-01 4.995E-04 4.996E+00 
ranking C >C>B>A B>C >A>C B>C >A>C B>C >A>C B>A>C >C 
sequential 
N/A B→C → >C B→C → >C B→C → →C B→ →C →C order for  
maintenance 
Table 5.3: Measure and Ranking of Importance with Respect to RS Using Parameter Set 2 
e q FV CIF IP RRW 
A 9.000E-04 1.800E-04 1.800E-04 9.000E-08 1.000E+00 
B 5.000E-04 9.998E-01 9.998E-01 5.000E-04 5.556E+03 
C 1.000E-04 1.799E-04 1.799E-04 8.996E-08 1.000E+00 
C  9.999E-01 9.989E-01 9.989E-01 4.995E-04 5.556E-01 
ranking C >A>B>C B>C >A>C B>C >A>C B>C >A>C B>A>C>C  
sequential 
N/A B→C → →C B→C → →C B→C → →C B→ →C→C  order for  
maintenance 
Table 5.4: Measure and Ranking of Importance with Respect to RS Using Parameter Set 3 
e q FV CIF IP RRW 
A 9.000E-04 4.482E-03 4.482E-03 4.500E-07 1.005E+00 
B 1.000E-04 9.955E-01 9.955E-01 9.995E-05 2.231E+02 
C 5.000E-04 4.482E-03 4.482E-03 4.500E-07 1.004E+00 
C  9.995E-01 9.946E-01 9.946E-01 9.986E-05 1.116E-01 
ranking C >A>C>B B>C >A>C B>C >A>C B>C >A>C B>A>C>C  
sequential 
N/A B→C → →C B→C → →C B→C → →C B→ →C→C  order for  
maintenance 







e q FV CIF IP RRW 
A 1.000E-04 5.558E-05 5.558E-05 5.000E-08 1.000E+00 
B 9.000E-04 9.999E-01 9.999E-01 8.996E-04 1.799E+04 
C 5.000E-04 5.553E-05 5.553E-05 4.996E-08 9.996E-01 
C  9.995E-01 9.998E-01 9.998E-01 8.995E-04 8.996E+00 
ranking C >B>C>A B>C >A>C B>C >A>C B>C >A>C B>A>C>C  
sequential 
N/A B→C → →C B→C → →C B→C → →C B→ →C→C  order for  
maintenance 
Table 5.6: Measure and Ranking of Importance with Respect to RS Using Parameter Set 5 
e q FV CIF IP RRW 
A 5.000E-04 5.556E-05 5.556E-05 5.000E-08 1.000E+00 
B 9.000E-04 9.999E-01 9.999E-01 8.999E-04 1.800E+04 
C 1.000E-04 5.551E-05 5.551E-05 4.996E-08 1.000E+00 
C  9.999E-01 9.994E-01 9.994E-01 8.995E-04 1.800E+00 
ranking C >B>A>C B>C >A>C B>C >A>C B>C >A>C B>C >A>C 
sequential 
N/A B→C → →C B→C → →C B→C → →C B→C → →C order for  
maintenance 
Table 5.7: Measure and Ranking of Importance with Respect to RS Using Parameter Set 3 
e q BM RAW CP RA 
A 5.000E-04 9.000E-04 9.963E+00 9.999E-04 8.996E-04 
B 1.000E-04 9.991E-01 9.955E+03 9.991E-01 9.990E-01 
C 9.000E-04 5.000E-04 4.982E+00 5.000E-04 3.996E-04 
C  9.991E-01 9.995E-05 1.996E+00 2.004E-04 1.000E-04 
ranking C >C>A>B B>A>C>C  B>A>C>C  B>A>C>C  B>A>C>C  
maintenance 
N/A B→ →C→C  B→ →C→C  B→ →C→C  B→ →C→C  
Priority 







e q BM RAW CP RA 
A 1.000E-04 9.000E-04 2.801E+00 1.400E-03 8.999E-04 
B 5.000E-04 9.991E-01 2.000E+03 9.991E-01 9.986E-01 
C 9.000E-04 9.995E-05 2.001E-01 1.000E-04 -3.996E-04 
C  9.991E-01 5.000E-04 2.001E+00 9.996E-04 5.000E-04 
ranking C >C>B>A B>A>C >C B>A>C >C B>A>C >C B>A>C >C 
maintenance 
N/A B→ →C →C B→ →C →C B→ →C →C B→ →C →C 
Priority 
Table 5.9: Measure and Ranking of Importance with Respect to SS Using Parameter Set 2 
e q BM RAW CP RA 
A 9.000E-04 1.000E-04 1.200E+00 6.000E-04 9.991E-05 
B 5.000E-04 9.999E-01 2.000E+03 9.999E-01 9.994E-01 
C 1.000E-04 8.996E-04 1.800E+00 9.000E-04 4.000E-04 
C  9.999E-01 4.996E-04 2.000E+00 1.000E-03 5.000E-04 
ranking C >A>B>C B>C>C >A B>C >C>A B>C >C>A B>C >C>A 
maintenance 
N/A B→C→C →  B→C →C→  B→C →C→  B→C →C→  
Priority 
Table 5.10: Measure and Ranking of Importance with Respect to SS Using Parameter Set 3 
e q BM RAW CP RA 
A 9.000E-04 5.000E-04 5.976E+00 6.000E-04 4.996E-04 
B 1.000E-04 9.995E-01 9.955E+03 9.995E-01 9.994E-01 
C 5.000E-04 8.999E-04 8.964E+00 9.000E-04 7.996E-04 
C  9.995E-01 9.991E-05 1.996E+00 2.004E-04 1.000E-04 
ranking C >A>C>B B>C>A>C  B>C>A>C  B>C>A>C  B>C>A>C  
maintenance 
N/A B→C→ →C  B→C→ →C  B→C→ →C  B→C→ →C  
Priority 





e q BM RAW CP RA 
A 1.000E-04 5.000E-04 1.556E+00 1.400E-03 5.000E-04 
B 9.000E-04 9.995E-01 1.111E+03 9.995E-01 9.986E-01 
C 5.000E-04 9.991E-05 1.112E-01 1.000E-04 -7.996E-04 
C  9.995E-01 8.999E-04 2.000E+00 1.800E-03 9.000E-04 
ranking C >B>C>A B>C >A>C B>C >A>C B>C >A>C B>C >A>C 
maintenance 
N/A B→C → →C B→C → →C B→C → →C B→C → →C 
Priority 
Table 5.12: Measure and Ranking of Importance with Respect to SS Using Parameter Set 5 
e q BM RAW CP RA 
A 5.000E-04 1.000E-04 1.111E+00 9.999E-04 9.995E-05 
B 9.000E-04 9.999E-01 1.111E+03 9.999E-01 9.990E-01 
C 1.000E-04 4.996E-04 5.556E-01 5.000E-04 -4.000E-04 
C  9.999E-01 8.996E-04 2.000E+00 1.800E-03 9.000E-04 
ranking C >B>A>C B>C >C>A B>C >A>C B>C '>A>C B>C >A>C 
maintenance 
N/A B→C →C→  B→C → →C B→C → →C B→C → →C 
Priority 
Table 5.13: Measure and Ranking of Importance with Respect to SS Using Parameter Set 6 
The ranking of various RIMs are given in the second last row of Table 5.2-5.13; the 
last row has shown the sequential order of maintenance according to the ranking. With 
respect to the risk significance, the sequential orders of maintenance are as same as the 
rankings; for safety significance, the maintenance priority is identical to the rankings. 
Most of the ranking results from Table 5.2-5.13 have shown that component B 
should be paid the most attention which is reasonable because component B not only co-
exists in a same cut set with component A, but also in a same prime implicant set with   
which has the greatest value of probability. Based on the real system, the vulnerability of 
level sensor (related to component B) requires most attention. 
Thus for the non-coherent system, CIF, FV and IP provide the same ranking for all 
six data sets.  As an informative risk significant measure for coherent systems, RRW cannot 
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show a consistent and informative result in non-coherent systems, as the RRW of a non-
coherent event depends on the probabilities of the other events which belong to the prime 
implicant sets that includes the negation of the non-coherent event; and is totally 
independent of the probability of the given non-coherent event/components. As a result, 
although CIF, FV, IP and RRW measures risk significance for coherent systems, CIF, FV 
and IP are the more applicable than RRW as risk significant measures which provide useful 
information for maintenance in non-coherent systems.  
RA, RAW and CP provide the same ranking results and the results also vary 
according to different data sets, whereas BM shows different ranking results. Even though 
BM can be considered as a safety significant measures as it is totally independent of the 
unavailability of the component, it shows meaningless ranking due to its definition. As a 
result, RA, RAW and CP are more applicable as safety significant measures which provide 
useful information for maintenance in non-coherent systems. 
On the other hand, the analysis has shown that the non-coherent components 
cannot be deliberately set to be ‗failed‘ during maintenance activities. The coherent 
components existing in the same minimal cut sets and prime implicant sets with the non-
coherent component should draw more attention than the non-coherent component itself, 
although the non-coherent components usually ranks higher because the availability is always 
higher than the unavailability of one component. 
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5.2 The Application of Non-coherent Fault Tree Analysis on a 
Gas Detection System 
5.2.1 Gas Detection System  
Analyzing a multitasking system is the one of the best ways to illustrate the use of 
NOT logic, because it has been demonstrated that there needs to be a convincing reason for 
their inclusion [27].  In this case the outcomes of the system performance can produce 
combinations of some tasks being performed whilst others have failed. The causes of each 
system outcome cannot be identified correctly without accounting for the parts of the system 
which have worked. A Simplified Gas Detection System (GDS) has been used in [51] and [44] 
and shown in Figure 5.5. 
 
Figure 5.5: Simplified Gas Detection System 
In this system, two gas sensors are denoted by D1 and D2; both of them are used to 
detect a leakage of gas in a confined space. The signals from these detectors are fed along 
individual cables back to the computer logic control unit (LU). On receiving a signal which 
represents a gas leak from either detector the system has three functions: 
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(a) Process shut-down (isolation)—by de-energizing relay R1; 
(b) Inform the operator of  the leak by lamp/siren labeled L; 
(c) Remove the power supply (potential ignition sources) to the affected area by de-
energizing relay R2. 
All the three tasks should be completed or the system will be considered to fail by 
giving a leak condition. The fault tree diagram for the top event is shown in Figure 5.6. 
 
Figure 5.6: Fault Tree for Gas Detection System 
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5.2.2 Demonstration of Non-coherent Fault Tree Analysis on the GDS 
Boolean analysis of this fault tree gives minimal cut sets: L, R1, R2, LU, D1D2. 
However, the overall system seems to be coherent. It can only be considered non-coherent 
in certain circumstances. Because gate at the top of the fault tree is an OR gate, any 
occurrence of the three tasks (represented by G1, G2 and G3) can cause the top event, there 
are 7 (23-1) outcomes of the system failure, which is shown in Table 5.14. 
Gate G1 G2 G3 
Outcome Operator Informed Process Shutdown Power Isolation 
1 W W F 
2 W F W 
3 W F F 
4 F W W 
5 F W F 
6 F F W 
7 F F F 
W: Subsystem at working state 
F: Subsystem fails 
Table 5.14: Gas Detection System Outcome 
Even though they all cause the top event, the seven outcomes have different severity 
between each other. However, the possibility of outcome 3 is rather small as it indicates that 
the operator thinks everything is fine but the process has not shut down, nor has the power 
been isolated. Because the quantification of the fault tree will substantially overestimate the 
probability of the outcome 3, the functioning part of the system is taken into consideration. 
Thus the NOT gate should be used in the proper assessment.  




Figure 5.7: Non-coherent Fault Tree Diagram for Outcome 4 
Incorporating the logic function and Boolean theorem into the non-coherent system, 
given the logic equation for each of the gates is given as: 
G1=L+LU+D1∙D2                  = L ∙LU    ∙ D1    +D2     =L ∙LU    ∙D1    +L ∙LU    ∙D2     
G2=R1+LU+D1∙D2 
G3=R2+LU+D1∙D2 
Top=G1∙G2∙G3= L ∙LU    ∙D1    +L ∙LU    ∙D2     ∙ R1+LU+D1∙D2 ∙ R2+LU+D1∙D2  
=L ∙LU    ∙R1∙R2∙D1    +L ∙LU    ∙R1∙R2∙D2     
Thus, the fault tree for this particular failure mode has two prime implicant sets: 
{ ∙      ∙ 1∙ 2∙ 1    }  and { ∙      ∙ 1∙ 2∙ 2    }. The simplified fault tree which took the 




L LU R2 D1R1 L LU R2 D1R1
 
Figure 5.8: Simplified Fault Tree for Outcome 4 




































To illustrate the method used to analyze component importance, the data assigned to 
each component in [54] can be used in here: 
 
Component i qi pi 
L 0.01 0.99 
LU 0.04 0.96 
R1 0.06 0.94 
R2 0.06 0.94 
D1 0.02 0.98 
D2 0.02 0.98 
Table 5.15: Component Availability/Unavailability Values for GDS 
113 
 
There are six events that need to be focused on according to the fault tree in Figure 
5.8: L , LU    , R1, R2, D1    , D2    . In this case, the failure criticality of R1 and R2 are concerned 
while the repair criticality of component L, LU, D1 and D2 are concerned. The importance 
of each event can be calculated with respect to various RIMs. The results are calculated in a 
spread sheet of Excel and shown in Table 5.16.  
e BM RA CP RAW 
L  0.003454618 3.45462E-05 0.003454618 1.01010101 
LU     0.003562574 0.000142503 0.003562574 1.041666667 
R1 0.05700119 0.053581119 0.05700119 16.66666667 
R2 0.05700119 0.053581119 0.05700119 16.66666667 
D1     6.84288E-05 1.36858E-06 0.00342144 1.00040016 
D2     6.84288E-05 1.36858E-06 0.00342144 1.00040016 
Ranking R1=R2>LU    >L >D1    =D2     R1=R2>LU    >L >D1    =D2     R1=R2>LU    >L >D1    =D2     R1=R2>LU    >L >D1    =D2     
e CIF IP FV RRW 
L  1 0.003420071 1   
LU     1 0.003420071 1   
R1 1 0.003420071 1   
R2 1 0.003420071 1   
D1     0.019607843 6.70602E-05 0.003353011 1.02 
D2     0.019607843 6.70602E-05 0.003353011 1.02 
Ranking R1=R2=LU    =L >D1    =D2     R1=R2=LU    =L >D1    =D2     R1=R2=LU    =L >D1    =D2     R1=R2=LU    =L >D1    =D2     
Table 5.16: Measures and Rankings of Component Importance for GDS 
The results have reflected the categorization of various RIMs as the risk significant 
measures (CIF, IP, FV and RRW) record the same results of ranking while safety significant 
measures (BM, RA, CP and RAW) have recorded the same results of ranking as well. 
According to the safety significant measures, coherent event R1 and R2 are ranked 
highest. From this ranking, R1 and R2 should be put into the highest maintenance priority 
than the other components and preventive maintenance activity should be taken to increase 
the availability of R1 and R2 in order to reduce the likelihood of system failure.   
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Components LU and L were ranked 2nd and 3rd highest, while both of them are 
non-coherent. Thus they can only be repair critical. However, it is not appropriate to reduce 
the availability of components that can be repair critical during maintenance activities. The 
probability of existence of the necessary and sufficient conditions for the component to be 
repair critical should be minimized. D1 and D2 are always ranked behind the other 
components as they do not appear in both prime implicant sets.  
The repair of a component which can be repair critical needs to be done when it is 
not repair critical. The ranking results have reflected the fact that during the maintenance on 
the non-coherent system, the other failure critical components should be repaired prior to 
the repair critical components i.e. the non-coherent components.   
Because components L, LU, R1 and R2 have the same status in the fault tree, they 
have the same value of importance according to the rankings provided by risk significant 







5.3 The Application of Non-coherent Fault Tree Analysis on 
the Automatic Power Control System 
An Automatic Power Control System (APCS) of the experimental nuclear reactor of 
Tsinghua University is introduced in [61]. The flowsheet of APCS is shown in Figure 5.9. 
This system helps keep the reactor power to the demanded value by adjustment. The system 
contains two negative feedback loops while one of them is in the standby mode. In the 

















Amplifier 1 Amplifier 2





Loop 1 Loop 2
 
Figure 5.9: The Flowsheet of APCS 
An electric current I is given to the comparator from the ionization chamber, where I 
is compared to the standard electric current I0 set according to the power value demanded. 
The difference between the two is sent the amplifier before passing through the loop switch 
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to the exciter. It is sent to the DC motor after the amplification. The reactor power is 
adjusted by the DC motor as it lifts and drops the control rod. 
The two loops are performed independently. Each loop contains one ionization 
chamber to measure the reactor power, one comparator to compare this value to the 
demanded value, and one amplifier to magnify the control current. When any one of these 
components fail, their corresponding relays will open up, so that the control can be 
automatically switched to the other loop. The switching mechanism is shown in Figure 5.10. 
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Figure 5.10: The Loop Switch of APCS 
There are four assumptions made for the sake of simplification in FTA: 
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1. Loop 1 has the priority to be closed first, i.e. if relay 1-3 are closed, the 
loop switch inclines to loop 1, which means that relay 9 is open and relay 
10 is closed. This assumption is the real situation when the hand switch is 
turned to loop 1. 
2. Relay 9 and 10 are 100% reliable (unavailability set to 0). 
3. The failure mode of relays are ―failed to close‖. 
4. The 100V DC supply is 100% reliable. 
Base on the assumptions, the fault tree for APCS can be illustrated in RELEX Studio 
with the data input. The fault tree is shown in Figure 5.11. The basic events are shown in 



















































1 Excitor fails 20 
2 DC motor fails 9.99 
3 Control rod is stuck 9.99 
4 Relay 1 fails to close 9.99 
5 Relay 2 fails to close 9.99 
6 Relay 3 fails to close 9.99 
7 Relay 4 fails to close 9.99 
8 Relay 5 fails to close 9.99 
9 Relay 6 fails to close 9.99 
10 Amplifier 1 fails 99 
11 Amplifier 2 fails 99 
12 Ionization chamber 1 fails 196 
13 Ionization chamber 2 fails 196 
14 Comparator supply 1 fails 9.99 
15 Comparator supply 2 fails 9.99 
16 Comparator 1 fails 4 
17 Comparator 2 fails 4 
18 Relay 7 fails to close 9.99 
19 Relay 8 fails to close 9.99 
  
Table 5.17: Basic Events and Their Unavailabilities  
Because the system involves NOT logic in the fault tree, it is considered non-
coherent in fault tree analysis. Based on the fault tree analysis in [61], this system contains 52 
prime implicant sets as follows: {1}, {2}, {3}, {4, 7}, {4, 8}, {4, 9}, {4, 11}, {4, 13}, {4, 15}, 
{4, 17}, {4, 19}, {5, 7}, {5, 8}, {5, 9}, {5, 11}, {5, 13}, {5, 15}, {5, 17}, {5, 19}, {6, 7}, {6, 
8}, {6, 9}, {6, 11}, {6, 13}, {6, 17}, {6, 19}, {10, 7}, {10, 8}, {10, 9}, {10, 11}, {10, 13}, 
{10, 15}, {10, 17}, {10, 19}, {12, 7}, {12, 8}, {12, 9}, {12, 11}, {12, 13}, {12, 15}, {12, 17}, 
{12, 19}, {14, 7}, {14, 8}, {14, 9}, {14, 11}, {14, 13}, {14, 15}, {14, 17}, {14, 19}, { 4 , 
5 , 6 , 10 , 12 , 14 , 16}, { 4 , 5 , 6 , 10 , 12 , 14 , 18}.  






Although there are 19 coherent events existing in the fault tree, six of them (4 , 5 , 6 , 
10 , 12 , 14 ) are non-coherent. Thus there are 25 events that needs to be considered in 
calculation and ranking according to various RIMs. The calculation of BM and FV can be 
done with RELEX Studio with the non-coherent events set to independent. However, 
because the software does not involve the assessment with the other measures, the 
calculation is also done with the help of Excel. 
 The calculated results are shown in Table 5.18. The rankings provided by various 
RIMs of all the events are listed in order to show the sequential order of maintenance; they 
are listed with respect to risk significant measures and safety significant measures in Table 
5.19 and Table 5.20, respectively. 
It should be noted that the negative values of RA is due to the subtraction of the 






# Description BM CIF IP FV RA CP RAW RRW 
1 Excitor fails 9.97E-01 3.07E-01 1.99E-03 3.08E-01 9.94E-01 1.00E+00 1.54E+02 9.39E-03 
2 DC motor fails 9.98E-01 1.53E-01 9.97E-04 1.54E-01 9.94E-01 1.00E+00 1.54E+02 7.68E-03 
3 Control rod is stuck 9.98E-01 1.53E-01 9.97E-04 1.54E-01 9.94E-01 1.00E+00 1.54E+02 7.68E-03 
4 Relay 1 fails to close 3.34E-02 5.13E-03 3.33E-05 5.36E-03 2.84E-02 3.49E-02 5.37E+00 6.54E-03 
4  Relay 1 close as required 1.31E-03 2.01E-01 1.30E-03 2.08E-01 -6.11E-03 3.87E-04 5.96E-02 8.21E-03 
5 Relay 2 fails to close 3.34E-02 5.13E-03 3.33E-05 5.36E-03 2.84E-02 3.49E-02 5.37E+00 6.54E-03 
5  Relay 2 close as required 1.31E-03 2.01E-01 1.30E-03 2.08E-01 -6.11E-03 3.87E-04 5.96E-02 8.21E-03 
6 Relay 3 fails to close 3.34E-02 5.13E-03 3.33E-05 5.36E-03 2.84E-02 3.49E-02 5.37E+00 6.54E-03 
6  Relay 3 close as required 1.31E-03 2.01E-01 1.30E-03 2.08E-01 -6.11E-03 3.87E-04 5.96E-02 8.21E-03 
7 Relay 4 fails to close 3.21E-02 4.93E-03 3.20E-05 1.59E-01 2.70E-02 3.35E-02 5.15E+00 7.72E-03 
8 Relay 5 fails to close 3.21E-02 4.93E-03 3.20E-05 1.59E-01 2.70E-02 3.35E-02 5.15E+00 7.72E-03 
9 Relay 6 fails to close 3.21E-02 4.93E-03 3.20E-05 1.59E-01 2.70E-02 3.35E-02 5.15E+00 7.72E-03 
10 Amplifier 1 fails 3.37E-02 5.13E-02 3.33E-04 5.31E-02 2.84E-02 3.49E-02 5.37E+00 6.86E-03 
10  Amplifier 1 works 1.32E-03 2.01E-01 1.30E-03 2.08E-01 -6.11E-03 3.90E-04 6.00E-02 8.21E-03 
11 Amplifier 2 fails 3.23E-02 4.93E-02 3.20E-04 2.12E-02 2.70E-02 3.35E-02 5.15E+00 6.64E-03 
12 Ionization chamber 1 fails 3.40E-02 1.03E-01 6.67E-04 1.05E-01 2.84E-02 3.49E-02 5.37E+00 7.26E-03 
12  Ionization chamber 1 works 1.33E-03 2.01E-01 1.30E-03 2.08E-01 -6.10E-03 3.97E-04 6.10E-02 8.21E-03 
13 Ionization chamber 2 fails 3.27E-02 9.85E-02 6.41E-04 1.01E-01 2.70E-02 3.35E-02 5.15E+00 7.23E-03 
14 Comparator supply 1 fails 3.34E-02 5.13E-03 3.33E-05 5.36E-03 2.84E-02 3.49E-02 5.37E+00 6.54E-03 
14  Comparator supply 1 works 1.31E-03 2.01E-01 1.30E-03 2.08E-01 -6.11E-03 3.87E-04 5.96E-02 8.21E-03 
15 Comparator supply 2 fails 3.21E-02 4.93E-03 3.20E-05 1.58E-01 2.70E-02 3.35E-02 5.15E+00 7.72E-03 
16 Comparator 1 fails 9.65E-01 5.94E-02 3.86E-04 2.08E-01 9.60E-01 9.67E-01 1.49E+02 8.21E-03 
17 Comparator 2 fails 3.20E-02 1.97E-03 1.28E-05 1.45E-03 2.70E-02 3.35E-02 5.15E+00 6.51E-03 
18 Relay 7 fails to closed 9.66E-01 1.48E-01 9.65E-04 2.08E-01 9.60E-01 9.67E-01 1.49E+02 8.21E-03 
19 Relay 8 fails to closed 3.21E-02 4.93E-03 3.20E-05 1.59E-01 2.70E-02 3.35E-02 5.15E+00 7.72E-03 







Event CIF IP Ranking 
 
Event FV RRW Ranking 
1 Excitor fails 3.07E-01 1.99E-03 1 
 
1 Excitor fails 3.08E-01 9.39E-03 1 
4  Relay 1 closed as required 2.01E-01 1.30E-03 
2 
 
4  Relay 1 closed as required 2.08E-01 8.21E-03 
2 
5  Relay 2 closed as required 2.01E-01 1.30E-03 
 
5  Relay 2 closed as required 2.08E-01 8.21E-03 
6  Relay 3 closed as required 2.01E-01 1.30E-03 
 
6  Relay 3 closed as required 2.08E-01 8.21E-03 
10  Amplifier 1 works 2.01E-01 1.30E-03 
 
10  Amplifier 1 works 2.08E-01 8.21E-03 
12  Ionization chamber 1 works 2.01E-01 1.30E-03 
 
12  Ionization chamber 1 works 2.08E-01 8.21E-03 
14  Comparator supply 1 works 2.01E-01 1.30E-03 
 
14  Comparator supply 1 works 2.08E-01 8.21E-03 
2 DC motor fails 1.53E-01 9.97E-04 
3  
16 Comparator 1 fails 2.08E-01 8.21E-03 
3 Control rod is stuck 1.53E-01 9.97E-04 
 
18 Relay 7 fails to closed 2.08E-01 8.21E-03 
18 Relay 7 fails to closed 1.48E-01 9.65E-04 4 
 
7 Relay 4 fails to close 1.59E-01 7.72E-03 
3 
12 Ionization chamber 1 fails 1.03E-01 6.67E-04 5 
 
8 Relay 5 fails to close 1.59E-01 7.72E-03 
13 Ionization chamber 2 fails 9.85E-02 6.41E-04 6 
 
9 Relay 6 fails to close 1.59E-01 7.72E-03 
16 Comparator 1 fails 5.94E-02 3.86E-04 7 
 
19 Relay 8 fails to closed 1.59E-01 7.72E-03 
10 Amplifier 1 fails 5.13E-02 3.33E-04 8 
 
15 Comparator supply 2 fails 1.58E-01 7.72E-03 
11 Amplifier 2 fails 4.93E-02 3.20E-04 9 
 
2 DC motor fails 1.54E-01 7.68E-03 
  
4 Relay 1 fails to close 5.13E-03 3.33E-05 
10 
 
3 Control rod is stuck 1.54E-01 7.68E-03 
5 Relay 2 fails to close 5.13E-03 3.33E-05 
 
12 Ionization chamber 1 fails 1.05E-01 7.26E-03 4 
6 Relay 3 fails to close 5.13E-03 3.33E-05 
 
13 Ionization chamber 2 fails 1.01E-01 7.23E-03 5 
14 Comparator supply 1 fails 5.13E-03 3.33E-05 
 
10 Amplifier 1 fails 5.31E-02 6.86E-03 6 
7 Relay 4 fails to close 4.93E-03 3.20E-05 
11 
 
11 Amplifier 2 fails 2.12E-02 6.64E-03 7 
8 Relay 5 fails to close 4.93E-03 3.20E-05 
 
4 Relay 1 fails to close 5.36E-03 6.54E-03 
8 
9 Relay 6 fails to close 4.93E-03 3.20E-05 
 
5 Relay 2 fails to close 5.36E-03 6.54E-03 
15 Comparator supply 2 fails 4.93E-03 3.20E-05 
 
6 Relay 3 fails to close 5.36E-03 6.54E-03 
19 Relay 8 fails to closed 4.93E-03 3.20E-05 
 
14 Comparator supply 1 fails 5.36E-03 6.54E-03 
17 Comparator 2 fails 1.97E-03 1.28E-05 12 
 
17 Comparator 2 fails 1.45E-03 6.51E-03 9 











Event BM Ranking 
 
Event RA CP RAW Ranking 
2 DC motor fails 9.98E-01 
1  
1 Excitor fails 9.94E-01 1.00E+00 1.54E+02 
1 3 Control rod is stuck 9.98E-01 
 
2 DC motor fails 9.94E-01 1.00E+00 1.54E+02 
1 Excitor fails 9.97E-01 2 
 
3 Control rod is stuck 9.94E-01 1.00E+00 1.54E+02 
18 Relay 7 fails to closed 9.66E-01 3 
 
16 Comparator 1 fails 9.60E-01 9.67E-01 1.49E+02 
2 
16 Comparator 1 fails 9.65E-01 4 
 
18 Relay 7 fails to closed 9.60E-01 9.67E-01 1.49E+02 
12 Ionization chamber 1 fails 3.40E-02 5 
 
4 Relay 1 fails to close 2.84E-02 3.49E-02 5.37E+00 
3 
10 Amplifier 1 fails 3.37E-02 6 
 
5 Relay 2 fails to close 2.84E-02 3.49E-02 5.37E+00 
4 Relay 1 fails to close 3.34E-02 
7 
 
6 Relay 3 fails to close 2.84E-02 3.49E-02 5.37E+00 
5 Relay 2 fails to close 3.34E-02 
 
10 Amplifier 1 fails 2.84E-02 3.49E-02 5.37E+00 
6 Relay 3 fails to close 3.34E-02 
 
12 Ionization chamber 1 fails 2.84E-02 3.49E-02 5.37E+00 
14 Comparator supply 1 fails 3.34E-02 
 
14 Comparator supply 1 fails 2.84E-02 3.49E-02 5.37E+00 
13 Ionization chamber 2 fails 3.27E-02 8 
 
7 Relay 4 fails to close 2.70E-02 3.35E-02 5.15E+00 
4 
11 Amplifier 2 fails 3.23E-02 9 
 
8 Relay 5 fails to close 2.70E-02 3.35E-02 5.15E+00 
7 Relay 4 fails to close 3.21E-02 
10 
 
9 Relay 6 fails to close 2.70E-02 3.35E-02 5.15E+00 
8 Relay 5 fails to close 3.21E-02 
 
11 Amplifier 2 fails 2.70E-02 3.35E-02 5.15E+00 
9 Relay 6 fails to close 3.21E-02 
 
13 Ionization chamber 2 fails 2.70E-02 3.35E-02 5.15E+00 
15 Comparator supply 2 fails 3.21E-02 
 
15 Comparator supply 2 fails 2.70E-02 3.35E-02 5.15E+00 
19 Relay 8 fails to closed 3.21E-02 
 
17 Comparator 2 fails 2.70E-02 3.35E-02 5.15E+00 
17 Comparator 2 fails 3.20E-02 11 
 
19 Relay 8 fails to closed 2.70E-02 3.35E-02 5.15E+00 
12  Ionization chamber 1 works 1.33E-03 12 
 
12  Ionization chamber 1 works -6.10E-03 3.97E-04 6.10E-02 5 
10  Amplifier 1 works 1.32E-03 13 
 
10  Amplifier 1 works -6.11E-03 3.90E-04 6.00E-02 6 
4  Relay 1 closed as required 1.31E-03 
14 
 
4  Relay 1 closed as required -6.11E-03 3.87E-04 5.96E-02 
7 
5  Relay 2 closed as required 1.31E-03 
 
5  Relay 2 closed as required -6.11E-03 3.87E-04 5.96E-02 
6  Relay 3 closed as required 1.31E-03 
 
6  Relay 3 closed as required -6.11E-03 3.87E-04 5.96E-02 
14  Comparator supply 1 works 1.31E-03 
 
14  Comparator supply 1 works -6.11E-03 3.87E-04 5.96E-02 
Table 5.20: Importance Rankings Provided by Safety Significant Measures 
Table 5.19 shows that CIF and IP provide the same rankings while the rankings 
provided by FV and RRW are identical. Both rankings put Event 1 to top priority as it not 
only corresponds with the top event directly but also has a relatively high unavailability 
comparing to Event 2 and 3 which are in the same status in the fault tree with Event 1.  This 
has reflected that risk significant measures are more influenced by the basic event 
probabilities than safety significant measures. The two are somewhat different as they FV 
and RRW tend to compare the importance of minimal cut sets or prime implicant sets. For 
example, Event 16 and 18 has the same priority with the 6 non-coherent events as they exist 
in the same prime implicant sets with them.  
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 The rankings provided by risk significant measures all put the 6 non-coherent events 
on the second place, which means relay 1, 2, 3, amplifier 1, Ionization Chamber 1 and 
Comparator Supply 1 should be checked to know whether or not the system failure is caused 
by the component at working state. For the sake of corrective maintenance, each of them 
should be simulated as failed before checking on the other components.  
The safety significant measures RA, CP and RAW give identical ranking results in 
Table 5.20. It can be seen that the Event 1, 2 and 3 have the highest ranking, thus the lowest 
defense-in-depth. Every effort should be made to avoid failure of the excitor or the DC 
motor to fail, or the control rod may be stuck.  
All the safety significant measures put the non-coherent basic events at the bottom 
of the list. This is expected since when the corresponding components function, the system 
performs the best. However, the ranking provided by BM is different due to the nature of 
BM itself, which is not appropriate for the sake of preventive maintenance. For example, 
according to the ranking provided by BM, the excitor should be checked after the DC motor 
and control rod, while the excitor has a higher failure probability than the other two.  
The ranking results given by RA, CP and RAW have generated an optimum sequence 
for preventive maintenance. The ranking has reflected that Event 1, 2 and 3 are at the top 
priority as any of them is associated with the top event. Event 16 and 18 are at second place 
before all the non-coherent events as they exist in the same prime implicant sets with the 





Conclusions and Future Work 
6.1 Conclusions 
The PSA methodology in the application of risk-informed maintenance is proposed 
in this thesis. The risk importance measures (RIMs) derived from FTA are utilized to provide 
sufficient information about existing and potential weak links of the overall system so that 
appropriate maintenance decisions can be made.  
The importance analysis of non-coherent systems is rather limited as the majority of 
RIMs that have been developed can only be used to analyze the coherent fault trees. In this 
thesis, various RIMs (Birnbaum‘s Measure, Criticality Importance Factor, Improvement 
Potential, Fussell-Vesely Measure, Risk Achievement, Conditional Probability, Risk 
Achievement Worth and Risk Reduction Worth) are investigated and extended to non-
coherent forms. The feasibility of the extension are proved and presented throughout the 
analysis and applications. 
On the other hand, RIMs are classified with respect to risk significance and safety 
significance, which serve for corrective and preventive maintenance, respectively. 
As stated, different maintenance strategies have different purposes and advantages. 
Compared to corrective maintenance, preventive maintenance may not be as practical to be 
conducted in slow-aged systems; whereas it is the other way around in a system with high 
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failure rate. However, in the application of FTA in non-coherent systems, preventive 
maintenance seems to be more reasonable choice, which has been reflected by the results 
from the theoretical analysis.  
6.2 Future Work 
FTA is only a part of PSA techniques in risk-informed maintenance. To gain insights 
into the dependence of subsystems within the safety systems, common cause failure (CCF), 
human reliability, uncertainty analysis and many other techniques should be used in the 
overall framework. In this thesis, RIMs are categorized with respect to risk and safety 
significance. However, they need to be specifically categorized into different types of 
maintenance tasks or different phases of maintenance activities, through further investigation. 
The uncertainty in probability of the basic event makes it difficult to rank the SSCs 
with respect to risk and safety significance. Even though the uncertainty has relatively small 
effects on the applications that requires categorization of SSCs [19], it should be considered 
as a factor in the integrated decision making process, particularly when the uncertainty is 
relatively larger. 
As stated, FTAs in the application of non-coherent systems are rather limited, and 
there are difficulties in analyzing the complex fault trees generated by large projects. The 
sequence provided by RIMs for non-coherent systems may not be the best option in practice 
because it only considers the mathematical characteristics of elements, but not their practical 
diagnosis and repair conditions, which is why different information from operations should 
be taken into consideration as well. Although the state-of-the-art software programs such as 
FTAP has relatively ideal algorithm to aid the calculation of prime implicant sets [63], most 
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of the RIMs for non-coherent systems cannot be assessed with computers. A computer 
aided method needs to be developed in the future for the importance analysis in the 
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